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Introduction

Women, the Middle East, and International Affairs
The Middle East has been a central topic in the Western media and politics ever since World War II. Interventions of Western countries in this region have not stopped at the end of the colonization era. On the contrary, Western military force was intermeddling during the Gulf War and today the ‘War against Terrorism’ is largely fought out in the Middle East. The situation in the region has been often determined as problematic. Investigating the possibilities of solving these problems may give us insight in the role Western countries should play. 
In Turkey, Iran, Egypt and elsewhere, the beginning of the twentieth century was a moment of intense political preoccupation with women and the family. In part this was the result of the encounter with Europe whether desired, ambivalent, or imposed through colonial occupation. The different attitudes of Middle Eastern countries resound in today’s problem with democracy and inherently connected, women’s rights. In this thesis I will investigate women’s emancipation, and not democracy, because women’s emancipation might well function as an acceptable indicator of actual democracy. Many countries in the Middle East claim to be democratic, but the contrary is displayed. Through history political struggles have been often supported by women but this has not resulted in women’s emancipation or in actual democracy. In countries where a development of women’s rights and women’s emancipation took place, actual democracy and freedom of speech have been established. The writers of “Arab Human Developments Reports” (New York: United Nations, 2002) even identify women’s low status as a cause – not a symptom – of the Arab world’s economic and political challenges. Although this notion is something worthwhile investigating in the future, my research of Middle Eastern women’s history is directed in the opposite way. In this thesis I will explain why women’s emancipation took place in certain Middle Eastern countries, and why it did not in others. 
Middle East specialist Peter Mansfield said that although it is useful to see social change in Arab Muslim society in terms of the emancipation of women, we have to be careful as women’s emancipation is a relatively new concept in Western development as well. I agree with him, but hope to clarify all uncertainty on the subject of women’s emancipation in my discussion of definitions, and will use the concept in a practical way, without unrealistic expectations.​[1]​ 
I will first explain why I limited the time span of the area of investigation to the last sixty years. One reason to investigate the history from 1950 until the present is because after World War II most Western countries adopted a decolonisation policy. The Middle East, with some exceptions, was officially decolonised as well. Looking at this period gives us a chance to see how nationality, culture, religion, politics and the economy developed without the official intermingling of a Western power. The problem is that cultural and economic colonisation is seen by many as the new and persistent form of colonisation in the Middle East. The Iranian Revolution is a very clear example of protest against this kind of colonisation. There is a difference between these two forms of colonization though. Middle Eastern countries have had more independence after 1950 than ever since the start of the colonization era. The second reason for choosing this period is that even in Western countries women’s emancipation developed only after the Second World War. It is not likely that the Middle East experienced women’s emancipation before the West did.
The relevance of the cases of Iran, Iraq and Turkey should also be explained. These cases are similar in some major aspects and different in others. Firstly, the countries are all situated in the Middle East and mostly inhabited by Muslims. Secondly, in different ways they all have been exposed to Western exploitation. Thirdly, they have many cultural and economic similarities. Iran experienced a leap to modernization, democracy and women’s emancipation after the Second World War and developed in a short period of time an almost exemplary form of women’s emancipation. This proved to be unstable during the Iranian Revolution in 1979 as a theocracy was introduced. In this thesis I have explained why. Iraq is a case that has been in the spotlight in many ways, but the country is also very difficult to investigate due to the political situation of the past decades. In this thesis I have explained why the role of the Iraqi Ba’th Party was decisive in women’s emancipation in Iraq, and not the role of Western cultural or political influence. Turkey as our last case could function as a role model of a Muslim inhabited secular society in which women’s emancipation and democracy have succeeded to the largest extent. At the same time, current Turkish debates on the role of religion in society and politics proves that a secular government is still not seen by every citizen as ideal.
In the first Chapter, a review of the history of the three countries before 1950 form the foundation for women’s achievements to be discussed in the following chapters. In chapter two, three and four, I have subsequently discussed the causes and success or failure of women’s emancipation in Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Chapter 5 provides a comparative analysis of the three countries in which Mill’s method of agreement will be used to detect the necessary causes of women’s emancipation in the Middle East. In this last concluding chapter I have also shed some light on the future prospects of women’s emancipation in the Middle East and made some suggestions for Western policy to assist democratic development and the emancipation of women, instead of counteracting it.

Discussion of Definitions
In order to be able to compare these three very different cases, a clear definition of the outcome, women’s emancipation, must be stated. The standard dictionary definition of ‘emancipation’ is ‘freedom’ or ‘liberation’. The Dutch Van Dale indicates a more extended meaning of the word by explaining ‘emancipation’ as ‘an endeavour of equal rights, independence, and fair social relations.’ Erwin J. Haeberle, in his The Sex Atlas (1981) describes women’s emancipation as women’s “liberation from religious, legal, economic, and sexual oppression, their access to higher education, and their escape from narrow gender roles.” Equality is one of the main indicators of emancipation. “Modern feminism originates in the equalizing thought of the eighteenth century”, states Mervyn Nicholson in a historical article on female emancipation. Within philosophy, equalizing thought had formerly been applied to social relations between aristocracy and commoners, but later on functioned as a decisive idea in women’s emancipation. Women’s emancipation, in this study, is therefore defined as the equality of women and men in the legal, educational, social, political and economic areas of life. Immediately a theoretical problem occurs with this definition as some writers state that women can be emancipated yet not liberated. By this they mean that in theory women can have certain rights, yet at the same time, for all kinds of reasons they are not using these rights. For instance, women have the right to receive education, but in practice they do not attend school because of the patriarchal structure of the household they belong to. To avoid misinterpretation of the term, the successful outcome of emancipation of women in this study is defined by both theoretical emancipation, the adjudication of certain rights to women, and by practical emancipation of women, the active usage of these rights. The latter form of emancipation cannot do without the first, and they are often intersected at many points. Therefore this division must not be considered as successive stages of emancipation, but as interdependent parts of women’s emancipation.​[2]​ 
Based on the definition above we will have to measure along two yardsticks. The theoretical emancipation of women can be measured along governmental policy towards women and legislation concerning their legal, educational, social, political and economic equality. The enforcements of these decrees and laws and the statistics concerning the execution of these equalities will show how far women were being emancipated. 
	Now that it is clear what a successful outcome of women’s emancipation looks like, the possible causes that produced this outcome must be listed. The first possible cause of women’s emancipation in the Middle East is the presence of a secular government that aims to modernize the country. A secular government is considered by some writers as essential for true emancipation of women, yet by others it is only mentioned as an accelerator of social transition. The second possible cause is the formation of women’s action groups that insert women’s awareness into society. In the case of Iran at the beginning of the twentieth century, women’s groups were the only source of a small movement in favour of women’s rights and education. The third causal influence is that of the absence of war. The First World War has had a positive on effect on women’s economic and social participation in many countries, Turkey included. In the second half of the twentieth century war rarely had a positive result regarding to the position of women. The absence of war might actually be essential for women’s emancipation. The last possible cause is economic progress in both efficiency and equity of the national economy. Yasmin Husein Al-Jawaheri is one of the few writers on Middle Eastern women who emphasises the influence of economy. She rightly does so as the further analysis will show that the condition of a national economy has great influence on the success of women’s emancipation.​[3]​

The Academic Context 
To explain the choice of possible causes for women’s emancipation, we should look at the academic discussion on national processes, state formation, state policy, and the role of popular culture during the twentieth century. One of the problems that was analysed by academics was the term of modernization in itself. Modernization conventionally meant the process toward a nation state, citizenship, democracy, civil society, individualism, economic development in the capitalist tradition, industrialization, world market urbanisation, and so forth. All societies were thought to move in the same direction which suggested the universality of the Western model. Orientalism and Islamism as a theoretic vehicle offered alternatives to the discussion on national processes as well as to the study of Muslim women within conventional Middle Eastern Studies. The development of feminism in the Middle East came up with new approaches. Radical feminism, Marxist feminism, and Islamic feminism all attempted to identify with the situation of women in Middle East.​[4]​ 
The image of Muslim women in the West was determined by oppression, unhappiness, and lack of autonomy. Muslim societies were depicted as inherently traditional, which was associated with backwardness. Modernity was associated with progress, which was Western in origin. According to Western modernization theory, the only way for women to emancipate and become happy seemed to let go of Islam. The mission to civilise Islamic societies through Christianity resulted in direct and indirect colonization. The obsession with Islam as the cause of society’s backwardness and women’s oppression was matched with a preoccupation with the state as the sole instrument and agent of social change. One of my cases, Iran, a leading modernist country, did not move in the anticipated direction however, and brought into question the credibility of modernization policy and theory. Conceptualization of tradition and modernity as fixed oppositional categories was then rejected, because “it overlooked the constant redefinition and reconstruction of these categories within current political processes.”​[5]​
In relation to women’s studies, theorists began to realise that in the West women’s emancipation also took a major struggle, and that emancipation was not automatically delivered by modernity. New theories had to replace modernization theory and its assumption of a causal relationship between modernization and women’s emancipation. The suppression of women was no longer considered connected to religion. All around the globe women’s rights were neglected. For example, the patriarchal system in rural China and its impact on culture and the position of women are actually very comparable to that of the Middle East. The foremost alternative was the dependency theory, the theory on developing nations according to the neo-Marxist interpretation. The theory advocated that global capitalism drained developing countries and thus these countries could not progress using the Western, capitalist system. The class system and inequality that stemmed from this situation caused especially women to be exploited in underdeveloped countries. In this view the cause of exploitation of women on the national, class and sexual level was not Islam, but rather the patriarchal class system caused by capitalism and imperialism. This corresponded to Iran’s rural poverty, growing gap between rich and poor, dependence on food imports, economic and political dependence on the United States, CIA intervention, and lack of political freedom and democracy.​[6]​
Another theoretic move was made by Islamists who made a claim to modernity.  In the 1970’s and 1980’s political Islam arose. It aimed to prove the progressive nature of the Qur’an, by either denying the ‘low statuses of women’ in Islam or attributing pre-Islamic traditions. The political defence of Islam considered the uniqueness of Islamic culture as the reason for Middle Eastern societies to take a separate development route, namely Islamic modernity. Islam “freed men and women to be real and natural beings and released women from capitalist violation as a sex-object and communist violation as an eternal labourer.”​[7]​ 
In chapter 2 on the case of Iran, I will analyse the successfulness of the alternative Islamic modernity in relation to women’s emancipation, but now I would like to add some different opinions on the matter, by diverse Iranian academics. Azar Tabari considers Islam’s all-encompassing nature as the main problem for women’s emancipation in the Islamic community. Although the interpretation of Islam might differ per region, if it is interpreted traditionally, women who want to emancipate are considered unbelievers and westernized.  Farah Azari rejects the existence of variation within Islam and argues that Islamic bias against women was “at the heart of the tradition of women’s subjugation in Muslim societies.” May Ghousoub argues that Islam and feminism are incompatible. But according to Haleh Afshar it is rather the ideology of male supremacy than Islam which affects women in the Middle East. We should keep these opinions in mind while analysing women’s history in the Middle East, because it is often documented by these very writers. The reason that I mostly use these kinds of sources, instead of books provided by Western analysts, is that most of the authors have experienced this history at first hand. This might have influenced the objectiveness of their stories, which will affect mine, but I have tried to balance my analysis by using statistics.​[8]​





Comparing different historical cases and processes is not an easy task. Still it is worth the effort because it makes history more useful in a sociological context and aims to evaluate and even iterate a certain positive outcome. Analysts using a comparative method generally face a finite set of cases, and aim to determine the causal sequences and patterns producing outcomes of interest in those specific cases. Generalization or acceptation of variation up to a certain point is needed to make a historical comparison workable. Through the analytical comparison of several cases with similar historical processes it is possible to test congruence of the proposed causes of a certain outcome. In this case the positive outcome is women’s emancipation in the Middle East.​[9]​
	In Charles Tilly’s Big Structures, Large processes, Huge Comparisons, several methods of historical comparison are explained. I would like to discuss them, to illustrate my choice of method. In the first place, we should not demand complete explanations, as these are virtually impossible due to the complexity of history. Therefore, in the search for the causes of certain historical processes, we should leave room for variance or generalization. At the same time, to prevent an endless analysis leading to nothing, the definition of the units of comparison should be firmly confined, although they are not perfectly comparable. In this case, the units of comparison are strictly defined by their national boundaries. The (imperfect) concurrence and similarity between the units of analysis is defined by their geographical site, being part of the same region, the Middle East, and the analogy of the historical role of Islam in society. 
In my analysis of women’s emancipation in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, I have analysed a single form of emancipation, as defined in Discussion of Definitions, instead of many possible forms of the phenomenon. To illustrate the theoretical possibilities of historical comparison, and my choice in these possibilities, I would like to use one of Tilly’s schematic illustrations.​[10]​

0.1 Ways of Comparing Big Structures and Large Processes​[11]​









I will now explain the four ways that are schematically reflected above. The first, individualizing comparison, “treats each case as unique, taking up one instance at a time, and minimizing its common properties with other instances.” The goal of individualizing comparisons is to compare certain cases in order to identify their singularities, not their similarities. This way of theorizing gives the opportunity to fully analyse a certain historical phenomenon into its very details. In this case, it could give us the opportunity to gain insight in different, nation-bound forms of women’s emancipation. A major problem is the impossibility to test the theory and the validity of the explanations being stated in such analysis. Another problem, in my case, is the lack of room for such detailed analysis.​[12]​ 
	A second way to compare historical processes is variation-finding. This kind of theorizing acknowledges that a certain phenomenon can have more than one form “by examining systematic differences among instances.” New evidence and cases can be easily added to the comparison and it has as its advantage that quantitative material can proof these variations in relatively simple way. The problem is that the method can easily result in superficiality of the analysis, solely based on statistical material. A classic work that balances the negative judgement of this kind of comparative method is Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Moore chose to divide his cases into categories of certain state forms, yet left room for different kinds of the instance of democracy or fascism. In this way, he was not claiming full explanations for a certain political outcome, nor did he indicate any absolutes. At the same time, the work does indicate why certain social causes may have led to different kinds of development to modernity in a rather convincing way, which was exactly the writer’s aim. Again, a troubling aspect was the testing of the theory, as there were no similar cases to compare a successful outcome with.​[13]​ 
	Thirdly, encompassing comparisons start of with a great development or a large structure. Within this structure, locations are selected, and compared to one another to explain the similarities and differences as a consequence of their relationships to the whole. The structure always needs a theory and definition to start with, which can be improved on the way. Also the connections between the several locations within the structure are based on a presumption that, later on, can be corrected. In an attempt to be correct, encompassing comparisons work with sets of “variables.” These variables often need generalization to make it practical. If no generalization is integrated, the comparison can turn into an “orderly juxtaposition of individual cases,” which is not the aim of such comparison. On the whole, this is not a method that is useful for my comparison, as I am not looking for the relationship of different locations to a big structure, for instance, world-wide Islam. Rather I am looking at a certain social phenomenon in different locations in which the big structure of Islam has no active or causal role.​[14]​





In my comparison of women’s emancipation in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, the ideal case is not one of the Middle Eastern countries discussed, nor a Western form of emancipatory development, but a theoretical proposition of what fully developed emancipation of women looks like, namely, equality with men. This non-existent perfectly successful case has no causes though, and cannot function as a unit of comparison. Therefore I want to analyse trends of successful women’s emancipation and contrast these to trends of unsuccessful women’s emancipation. I will use the universalizing method to explain why women’s emancipation has taken place in the Middle East in some places and periods, and why in others it has not. But first I will show as to how far women’s emancipation has taken place in Iran, Iraq and Turkey.
	To be able to structurally measure women’s emancipation in these three countries I will gauge emancipation in the five areas of society that have been discussed in the definition part of this chapter. In the analyses of each of the three countries I will look at women’s legal, educational, social, political and economic position and compare these to men’s to find out to what extent equality has been reached and analyse the trends of increasing equality. The subsequent discussion of legal, educational, social, political and economic equality of women will form the first part of each chapter and explain if trends of women’s emancipation have taken place in certain periods.




1. Backgrounds and Early Middle Eastern Feminism

Introduction
In this chapter I would like to shed some light on the history of my three cases before the period of investigation. This is necessary because it will show us as to how far progress already has been made in the area of women’s emancipation before 1950. This brief historical discussion focuses on the position of women in society, state and politics, and functions as the background for the proceeding analysis of women’s emancipation in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. 

Short background history of Iran before 1950
The history of Iranian Women is bound to two influential aspects. Firstly, it is bound to the history of Shi’i Islam. Secondly, it is bound to the governmental influence on women through policy. Both concepts are intertwined for most of the time in the history of Iranian women, yet there have been periods where they operated independently. The first concept, Shi’i doctrine, is the product of historical processes and changes, but it is presented by clerical leaders as timeless dogma. The ‘natural’ position of women is thus defined by the patriarchal angle clerics use to interpret Islam. But before clerics restricted the rights of women, there was a time when women could move freely as this was supported by the existing government.​[16]​
In ancient Persia some women in higher circles have participated in government, according to sources from 509 until 438 BC. During the Zoroastrian and Sasanian period women in higher circles seem to be treated quite equally and with respect as well. Several princesses ruled or co-ruled Persia. Also after Islam was implemented by the Abbasids, women have participated in government. Unfortunately, no written evidence tells us about the situation of women in lower classes. There are several examples of women in early Islam who played a vital role. Feminist writers often blame the development of a Shi’i clergy after this early period of the religion for women to have lost their rights and privileges and having become prisoners of the veil. It is very unclear whether women of lower classes had already experienced such treatment before the emergence of a clergy though. At any rate, after the period of early Islam, women were not allowed to go outside the harem of their house except when they would go to the bath house, which functioned as the meeting place. The central theme in women’s lives was marriage. Women lived in the house of their parents until a marriage contract was signed. Then the often very young girls would move in with the family of their bridegroom, most often complete strangers, and fulfilled their duties. Sometimes aristocratic families allowed girls to learn how to read and write.​[17]​ 
During the nineteenth century western ideas entered Iran as a feature of the colonial process. “Equality, freedom, human rights, economic development, social change, and other such positive concomitants of modernization mingled with another feature of colonialism – the harsh reality of material and moral exploitation- to produce schizophrenic response to the West and the values it stood for.” A dialectical tension between religion and modernism evolved and the woman as mother and wife became its strongest symbol. Female leaders emerged, and one group of feminists thought the ultimate solution for women’s inequality was to be found in separation of religion and government. Another group of feminists thought the West could not function as a standard in this matter, as there were too many differences in culture. Their goal was to contest the right and legitimacy of Iran’s patriarchal clerical order to be the sole interpreters of the values, norms, and aesthetic standards of Shi’i Islam, which lies at the core of Iranian culture.​[18]​
At the beginning of the twentieth century a new phenomenon was introduced. Iranian women formed secret societies gathering information on political affairs to influence the people involved and enforce patriotic devotion. Women’s dedication to the constitutional revolution, the foundation of the first parliament and the establishment of a constitution in 1906 did not result in improved women’s rights though. In 1909 universal suffrage was denied to women, criminals, offenders and murderers. Still, women kept on gathering and the ‘awakening’ of Iranian women was present at a low level. The Women’s Freedom Society encouraged both men and women to participate in the meetings secretly. The discussions were centred on the problems regarding women in the country. It did not have very much effect on society and they were heavily persecuted by traditionalists.​[19]​
The first public demonstration by hundreds of women was held outside the parliament building in 1911. The cause of national independence was seen as urgent and women voiced their opinion publicly when the Russian Ultimatum on the government had brought the National Ladies’ Society to the streets. The ladies were vocally opposed and regularly demonstrated against foreign influence and economic dependency. They bravely cried with one voice; “Independence or Death!”​[20]​
Women’s societies also directed their efforts on a more constructive basis to the cause of women’s emancipation. Iranian feminists admired the steady progress women’s emancipation made in Europe and considered the position of European women preferable because of their skills. To reach the same effect in Iran, high class women became fund raisers for girl’s orphanages and schools, and prominent men began to support them. The women in the societies reasoned that Iranian women were the victims of unruliness and lack of law and girls’ education was seen as the first step to prosperity. These women considered it their duty to open girls’ schools because education would make Iranian women aware of their legitimate rights and give them strength for a more vigorous national struggle. At that moment there was only a minority who saw the need of girls’ education. The ultimate goal of girls’ education was not for them to have a career outside the house. Rather the science of home management was developed and taught.   Missionary schools for girls had already been there but hardly any Moslem girls attended these until the introduction of the constitutional government. Tuba Azmudeh is one of the pioneers instructing girls to become teachers for girls. After the First World War the first state school for girls is opened. In 1940 a few Iranian women who attended this school even reached a B.A. degree on the New York State University. The headmistresses of girls’ schools were often patriots and devout and practicing Moslem believers.​[21]​ 
	Rezah Shah came to power in 1925 and dedicated his reign to the reunification and modernization of Iran. Girls’ education was an important part of his program as state and private girls’ schools were opened, but employment for women remained in the educational sector as teachers. The number of writers and politicians supporting the cause was growing and the Patriotic Women’s League (PWL), which operated from 1922 until 1932 held information seminars on the subject and supported education for women where needed. For example, in 1923 the PWL started lessons for adult women. Although these activities where countered by mullahs, they could not prevent it. In 1932 the first ‘Women’s International Congress of the East’ was held in Iran. The fruits of the development of girl’s education in Iran were further stimulated when in 1938 the Shah allowed girls to go to Tehran University with men. Following this trend Dr. Fatemeh Sayyah became the first female professor at Tehran University in 1942 after studying in Europe and the Soviet Union.​[22]​
In other areas of women’s emancipation the year of 1932 was decisive as well. Reza Shah came to realize that the pace of women’s advancement in Iran had to be accelerated. As an example for the rest of the population, high-ranking wives and daughters of the shah sometimes appeared at official gatherings without veils. At 7 January 1936 Reza Shah ordered the official unveiling of Iranian women. In reality this meant women always took a veil along, as it was still dangerous in certain quarters of Tehran to be on the streets without wearing one. On the other hand, women took of their veils when they entered a more government-controlled area of the city or when they entered a public area. The Shah also started a process of bringing women into civic life deliberately through the Ladies’ Center. This agency had legal personality and promoted the abandonment of the veil. Still, lower class women considered unveiling as the greatest sin.​[23]​
	The Second World War had a disruptive effect on the nation’s progress, also in the area of women’s emancipation mainly because the Shah had to leave the country while he had been the greatest initiator of all past developments of women’s emancipation in Iran. His son became the new monarch.
 
Short background history of Iraq before 1950 
The written history on Iraqi women is underdeveloped in comparison to that on Iranian women. Still I have been able to gather enough data to sufficiently support the story on Iraqi women in this part, and the history from 1950 until the present, in chapter three. 
In the Middle Ages, Iraq was not a country but a set of regions dependent on subsequent empires that ruled the area. Under the Abbasids in the twelfth century, women in higher circles had the opportunity to study medicine, law and theology. Women were known for their brains and their beauty. Again, there is not much material on the position of women in lower classes. After the Abbasids came the Mongols, and after the Mongols the Ottoman Empire was established in that region. The Turks maintained their hold over Iraq for four centuries until they were driven out by the allies after the First World War. The British policy was that “the oppressed people in these territories should obtain their freedom and independence.” In the period between the Abbasids and the nineteenth century, women had become oppressed people, but the British were not able to set them free.​[24]​
As for the political situation, the Arabs, expecting independence, had nominated Feisal, son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca, to be King of Iraq’s neighbouring country Syria. Feisal was quickly dethroned by the French and the British placed him on the throne of Iraq, a country the League of Nations had formed of several Ottoman regions in 1926. Thus the Hashemite monarchy was founded. In 1920 there was a major uprising, in which women also participated, against the establishment of the allied, unwanted government. It did not prevail and the British occupation including the government they had installed remained. As the years went by the British hold on Iraq gradually loosened and the country was declared independent in 1932 and became a member of the League of Nations. Feisal was succeeded by his son Ghazi, who died in a car accident only six years later. Ghazi was succeeded by his young son Faisal under regency.​[25]​ 
In the meantime some progress was made by women on the area of education. In 1914 Zahra Khidir pioneered the first private school for girls which had a very mixed reception. 





Short background history of Turkey before 1950 
Feminist Professor Dr. A. Afetinan claims that there exists written evidence that shows that men and women were treated equally in ancient civilizations in Anatolia, and that women had a preferable position. One significant sign of this social equality had been that women were trained in arms, just like men. The equal or even high status and position of women in ancient Turkish society was, according to Afetinan, culturally defined. Many of the sources that are used to prove that Anatolia was women-friendly in earlier times, are related to the worship of female deities in the pagan religions present from the time of the Hittites onwards. However, further evidence for these statements is found in material from the period of the Greek Orthodox Christian Byzantine Empire. Several empresses ruled it until the empire fell under the attacks of the Arabs. The introduction of Islam brought about social and legal changes.​[27]​ 
Afetinan states that the social life of women living in Anatolia after the introduction of Islamic laws became more and more restricted. Because Persia embraced Islam before the Turkish people did, Persian culture, its patriarchal system and its social customs influenced Turkish society. It is important to differentiate between the cultural attachments of Islam and Islam itself, when it caused restrictions on women’s lives. Many Muslim writers have emphasized the accommodating attitude of the prophet Mohammed towards women. The founder of Islam expressed that the “woman is the equal of man and the other half of society”, and “he who respect his wife’s rights is a good Moslem”, and “paradise lies under the feet of mothers”. Amina Wadud, an Islamic feminist, came to the conclusion that “… in Islam a female person was intended to be primordially, cosmologically, eschatologically, spiritually, and morally a full human being, equal to all who accepted Allah as Lord …” ​[28]​
  	Under the Ottoman regime, Turkish customs were forgotten and women became a minority as men increasingly had privileges over women. Urban and high class women became secluded and spent their lives in the harem of their houses. On the rare occasions they were allowed to go outside the house, they were veiled. Country women all over the empire were in the position of producers. Their work consisted of farming and home-economy, like weaving. They did not veil, worked along with men, and only covered their faces when they met a stranger.​[29]​
This situation changed dramatically in the nineteenth century. As in Western Europe modern civilization made a breakthrough by means of technical progress, women’s emancipation was placed on the political agenda. Nineteenth century Turkey experienced trends towards Western civilization, and this resulted in specific consequences for the situation of Turkish women. Schools for girls were opened in Istanbul. To not offend Islamic norms, from the age of eleven, girls were educated by female teachers. In the beginning of this trend only high class girls received education. The most educated women of that time were often poets and they were predominantly influenced by the West. In the following period, education of girls expanded as it became a leading idea that essentially through education, women could emancipate.​[30]​ 
 	At the start of the twentieth century men increasingly ventured to go out with their wives, which had been unusual up to that moment. This social change was strengthened by the dramatic historical events of this age. During World War I, men were sent to the front and women had to fill up the economic vacancy. In that period a faculty for girls was opened to the University of Istanbul. Passive resistance of women in regard to veiling, the right to go out freely, to ride in the same carriage as their husbands and to sit next to them, triumphed over the fanaticism of traditional public opinion. Women in the countryside did not participate in this first wave of women’s emancipation in Turkey.​[31]​
	The Turkish war of independence implied more enforcement of the emancipation trend. During World War I the Ottoman Empire allied with the Germans, and in the end the Allies occupied Istanbul. The Turkish national movement inspired a struggle for independence shortly afterwards. In this struggle women took an active part in organizing protest meetings in Istanbul. After 29 October 1923, when a democracy was instituted in Ankara and the monarchy was defeated by the Liberation Army, the ‘women’s question’ could no longer be ignored. Women had earned recognition and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first president of the Republic, supported their cause. He held speeches before parliament to get the members to vote for equal rights for women and the effect was that women in Turkey gained a similar social position as women in Western European countries. Elementary education became compulsory for children of either sex, and the adoption of the Latin alphabet made learning easier and decreased illiteracy among women. In the villages though, girls’ education lay behind on that in the cities. In the cities women began to work in industry and as a result of their education could become ‘skilled’ workers. In the rural area most women worked in agriculture but were not paid for their work in many cases. Also the numbers of women holding top positions were very small. A great breakthrough in women’s higher education was the possibility for women to become doctors. Civil Law and Family Law became more supportive of equality between men and women, but still it was difficult for women to exercise their rights. Another problem was that women received lower wages because “their” industries, carpet-weaving, textiles, food and clothing industries, had lower wages on the average. Atatürk did not make a stand to change this and always considered occupations of women subordinate to motherhood. ​[32]​
	Although there are some similarities with the Iranian case in this period, there are also some clear differences. Although Atatürk urged women to adopt European dress from 1925 onwards, he did not prohibit the veil like Rezah Shah did.​[33]​
In 1935 the first 18 women were elected for parliament. They were an example for women all over the Moslem world. Still, women in this period had not yet realized the opening given by law. A large portion of Turkish women were still kept in place by traditions. ​[34]​

Conclusion








2. Women’s Emancipation in Iran

“Women became emblems of national identity: forcefully unveiled they personify the modernization of the nation, compulsorily veiled, they embody the reinstitution of Islamic order.” - Lila Abu Lughod ​[35]​

Introduction
In the following analysis of women’s emancipation in Iran, I will point out it has always been connected to the existing political struggle. Some writers even think it is impossible to isolate women’s emancipation from the subsequent political circumstances in which it has been situated. According to them we should not read into it a form of ‘feminist consciousness’ which has so far remained specific to the Western context where feminism and women’s emancipation could be independent of political parties because of the democratic tradition. Women’s emancipation has taken place in Iran, but the ‘women’s question’ in politics has never existed in its own right. For instance, women did not participate in the Revolution as women, but as members of political and social forces. Although it is true that women’s activities were most often organized along dividing lines around the questions of Islam and Imperialism, I think there has been independent thought on women’s emancipation. Still women’s emancipation and politics in this case were very closely connected, while Iranian politics have been complex. Therefore I will look at the case’s politics more extensively than in the following chapters.​[36]​
	In the first part of this chapter I will analyse the success of women’s emancipation according to the indicators that have been mentioned in the introduction. In the second part, I will analyse the presence or non-presence of the four possible causes.

Indicators of women’s emancipation in Iran 

Legal equality and progress of Iranian Women
During the Second World War, the Pahlavi regime had remained intact and so had its policy towards women. Mohammed Reza Shah, after inheriting his father’s crown, preserved but did not sternly enforce the initiatives that had affected the general status of women in Iran, like the banning of the chador. During the reign of Rezah Shah (1925-1941), a group of religious women never left their houses because they feared being unveiled in public. During the reign of Mohammed Rezah Shah (1941-1979), many women began to wear the veil again. The legal banning of the chador for a part of the Iranian female population had been a limitation of their rights, rather than an extension of their legal equality.​[37]​ 
The following years of parliamentary politics under Mohammed Mossadeq (1951-1953) until his expulsion, did not produce many legal reforms for women. Mossadeq’s National Front had no programme on women because, at that moment, women’s rights were not considered a priority.​[38]​
A decade later, women received new legal opportunities. In 1962 Prime Minister Asadollah Alam announced that women could vote during the local elections. Ayatollah Khomeini sent him a telegram that Alam should not ignore the clergy in this matter, and that the bill should be declared illegal. Khomeini’s supporters spread rumours that women would be called up for military service and that young girls had already been taken to the barracks to arouse the public against the bill. Nevertheless, on 9 January 1963, six policy points including the legalization of women’s suffrage were officially introduced by the shah. A referendum was held to consolidate the six point reform program, but the confirmative outcome might have been obtained illegally. People in several cities protested against the supposedly manipulated outcome. Therefore the event has become known as the White Revolution. However, from that moment on, Iranian women had the right to vote as well as to run for, and hold public office. The SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police arrested Khomeini in the same year.​[39]​
	Another important legal step, reducing discrimination against women, was the 1967 Family Protection Law (FPL). This code gave women more rights in the areas of child custody and divorce, yet it remained within the Shari’a. Women of the lower classes or from rural areas were not likely to profit from the FPL, because they were less aware of their rights as a result of illiteracy and seclusion from the outer world. The laws did have some impact though. In the years after 1967, the divorce rate dropped dramatically because men could no longer divorce at will. In 1966-67, on the number of 151,000 reported marriages, there were 25,000 divorces, almost 17 percent. The following year, after the introduction of the FPL, this ratio decreased to 9.8 percent. The highest rate ever since was 11 percent. In the period from 1953 until 1967 the average divorce rate had been 18 percent. In the period from 1967 until 1977 the average divorce rate was 10 percent.​[40]​ 
Another example that shows the impact of these more women-friendly laws is the rising percentage of women that remarry after a divorce or the death of their first husband. The laws seem to have impacted on the public attitude and prevented sociocultural sanctions against women who decided to remarry. This can be deduced from the numbers of men and women over the age of sixty-five that are still married. In 1966, 85.5 percent of the men of older age were married, but only 26.3 percent of the older women were in the same condition. Ten years later, in 1976, the percentage of married elder men has remained stable at 85.3 percent. Yet for older women the situation had changed for the better as 37.8 percent was married. The life expectancy for men and women had remained stable over this period.​[41]​
The Islamic Revolution brought radical changes into the Iranian law system and to women’s rights in particular. Veiling was in the beginning of the revolutionary period for women a way of expressing their freedom. It also became a distinct expression of identity for the Muslim woman. It provided women with a different conception of what emancipation could mean. After the Revolution the veil became a struggle point however. For a short period of time, it was not clear whether veiling was obligatory under the Islamic regime, or not. A week after the installation of the Islamic Republic, petitions began to spread, and female employees were forced to either adopt the veil or leave. Soon in all public offices the veil was compulsory. Abstaining from veiling became identified with high treason and Western alliance.​[42]​ 
Khomeini showed a deep conviction of women’s inferiority, not only physically and psychologically, but also morally and intellectually. In contrast to his public speeches, his teachings relegated women to be the main object for satisfaction of male sexuality, although youths and even camels were discussed as secondary resources. Sodomy was not forbidden during menstruation because the man’s sexuality had no bounds according to Khomeini, and therefore women had to cover at all times. In most Islamic countries laws on women are harsher than prescribed by Islam, but Khomeini’s interpretations were amongst the most regressive. As a consequence of Khomeini’s influence on the legislation on women, on 26 February 1979 the Family Protection Laws were suspended. Khomeini’s office introduced new laws.​[43]​
 	On the second day of October 1979, the new family laws were ratified by the Council of Revolution. These laws, among other things, contained the following legislation, which worsened the legal position of Iranian women dramatically. Firstly, the right of divorce was given to the husband exclusively. Although there was a legal escape route for women, exemptions on this rule were rare. Secondly, the husband’s right to forbid his wife to take employment was reinstated. Thirdly, the official age of marriage for women was lowered from eighteen to thirteen years old. Fourthly, the husband, or his relatives in case of his death, was entrusted with the children’s custody. Lastly, men were permitted to take four permanent and an unlimited number of temporary wives, without the first wife’s consent. Also in the area of criminal law justice women’s status was lowered. For instance, only a male testimony could prove a murder, and a husband could kill his wife without being charged with any crime if he claimed she had been adulterous.​[44]​
While many reforms that Khomeini introduced through the years, affecting women’s position in a negative way, have remained unchanged until the present day, there are some exceptions that indicate the tide might be turning. In 1990, a year after the death of Khomeini, the Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani publicly acknowledged female sexuality. His proposal was to extend the possibility of temporary marriage to young women who had never been married before, to fill the sexual need. There was no benefit in fighting nature and the Qur’an did not forbid it, he claimed. This transgressed cultural boundaries and left many people confused. Was the President more progressive than the Shah? People wondered what the difference with the West was. A public debate on the matter started in which Shi’i clerics perceived temporary marriage as distinct from prostitution, despite the structural similarities. The first was considered religiously blessed, the second was legally forbidden. Although legislation might have changed in favor of women’s legal equality, popular culture still demands women to be virgins at the wedding night of their first permanent marriage.​[45]​
In the period until the Revolution an increase of Iranian women’s equality in the legal area of life is apparent. After the revolution most gains were reversed by the new regime. Then again, the last decade of the twentieth century shows a more progressive tendency in legislation regarding to women.	

Educational equality and progress of Iranian women
During the reign of the Shah, mass education was installed. This had considerable effect on the literacy of women. Only 8 percent of the Iranian women could read and write in 1956, while in 1971, 26.3 percent of all Iranian women had become literate. In the cities women’s literacy was even 49.4 percent, but in rural area only 8.5 percent of the female population over seven years old was literate.​[46]​
In the early 1970s, the Shah set up educational programs for women in the villages. This was specifically needed, which is illustrated by the statistics on urban and rural illiteracy among children of the year 1976. While in the cities 92 percent of the boys between 7 and 14 years old, and 89 percent of the girls of the same age could read and write, in the rural area 83 percent of the boys and only 36 percent of the girls were literate. Still, these percentages show at the same time great improvement in comparison with the literacy of males and females of over 15 years old. In the urban region only 48 percent of the mature males and 24 percent of the females have had the ability to read and write. In the rural area only 27 out of a hundred males and a meagre 7 percent of the females were literate. From this can be derived that there was clear improvement for both the sexes on educational level, but for women the improvement was greater, which means educational equality was rising. ​[47]​
Educational programs have also had effect on the educational level of female employees. The percentage of literate employed women was 30 percent in 1966, but increased to 65 percent of all employed women in 1976. The total number of employed females that had a high school diploma rose from 73,000 to 198,000 in the same time span.​[48]​
The installation of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) led to immediate Islamification of the national educational system. This meant for instance that while during the Pahlavi era women appeared in the textbooks 80 percent as often as men, under the Islamic regime this became 54 percent. Western style dress was excluded from the pictures in the textbooks as well. Another consequence was that all schools ran by foreigners were closed down. About 40,000 mostly female teachers were expelled or compulsory retired. Acute teacher shortages led to many of them being reinstated though. The schools were now strictly segregated and married girls were barred from high school. At the same time the marriage age for girls was lowered to thirteen. Still, if girls received education, they often performed better than boys and they completed their educational levels more often than the opposite sex. The Ministry of Education even had a special women’s issue unit after protests of its female employees and after the Revolution women still comprised forty-four percent of its total number of employees.​[49]​ 
	The universities remained closed for over four years after the Revolution. In 1978, 40 percent of the students in Tehran were women. By 1983, only 10 percent of Tehran University’s students were female, and women suffered from being barred from 119 subjects. In 1990, the percentage of female students had increased to 16 percent. The statistical yearbook reports a relatively stable overall female student’s percentage of 29 percent over the years from 1971 until 1986, with a slightly rising percentage of female graduates to 31 percent, to the disadvantage of male graduates. Nowadays, 51 percent of all students participating in tertiary education are female. Also the number of female university teachers rose from 14 percent in 1971 to 16.9 percent in 1986, while the actual number rose from 2,058 to 4,285. In 1994, women inhabited 40 percent of the university places.​[50]​
	Literacy continued to rise as well. Table 2.1 shows the stable progress of the education of the population, which is not dramatically interrupted by the Revolution.





















Female enrolment has increased steadily in the IRI. The gap between male and female participation was declining and thus educational equality was increasing. In primary and tertiary education, there is currently an inequality in favor of women.​[53]​
After the Revolution a trend of channeling women into fields of study considered ‘more appropriate’ for their sex was noticeable. Specialization in Iranian education began at the high school level, and women were virtually excluded from all technical and agricultural areas. They did make progress in many other areas, including natural sciences, math and physics, though women were a minority. We must take into account though, that the same trend appears in the West. Immediately after the Revolution, women were excluded from as many as 44 percent of the majors, including veterinary medicine, geology, natural sciences, politics, commercial management, accounting and so forth. This selection changed every subsequent year. Remarkable is that men were barred from some fields as well, like sewing, fashion design, midwifery, nursing, gynecology, dental hygiene and family health. On the whole, women have experienced major increase in their educational possibilities in Iran. An illustration of this fact is that in 1990, five times as many women were preparing at the college level to work in education as had been the case in 1977.​[54]​
	Iranian women have experienced some setbacks on the development of educational equality as a consequence of the Revolution but the gap between men and women in school attendance and literacy is still declining and has even disappeared at some levels.

Political equality and progress of Iranian women
Since 1963 women had the right to vote and to hold office. One of the few women who used their political rights and increased political equality under the reign of the Shah was Dr. Farrokhru Parsa. She was a doctor in medicine and became Iran’s first female cabinet minister as Minister of Education from 1968 to 1974. Theoretically, also after the Revolution, women enjoyed the right to vote and be elected to all public posts, but the only right fully exercised was the right to vote. The sole woman attending the Assembly of Experts then, Monireh Gorji, was quoted to have said that being beaten by your husband is better than to be divorced by him. According to her, enduring beatings prevents divorce. The constitution that finally emerged from this assembly was nothing but a document which provided the basis for a theocracy to be ruled by Khomeini who at will could sack the elected president and dissolve the parliament or make woman-unfriendly rules.​[55]​
Women were participating in the Majles, the parliament, and should have been granted all rights in the name of democracy, but little was achieved. Ten years after the Revolution women found other ways to avoid confrontation with the regime by criticizing Shari’a decisions, by reinterpreting gendered readings of the Qur’an and by demonstrating active presence in “every field of artistic creation, professional achievement, educational and industrial institutions, and even in sports.” Nine out of the two hundred and eighty members of the parliament were women, which was four percent higher than in Turkey, which is assumed to be more modern than Iran. This percentage of 3.2 percent of female delegates remained fairly stable in the following years. In 2005 the percentage rose to 4 percent, and remained stable to the present.​[56]​

Social equality and progress of Iranian women
During the reign of the Pahlavi rulers, there was a clear trend towards an improved social position of women. One of the indicators is the percentage of young girls being married. Most often girls had to give up education after marriage, so as long as they were not married, they could continue their education. In 1966 in the urban areas of Iran, 1.7 percent of the girls between 10 and 14 years old, and 38.8 percent of the girls between 15 and 19 years old were married. In the rural area this percentage was 2.7 and 49.4 percent. In some areas even 60 percent of the girls under nineteen were married. Ten years later in 1976, in the urban area 0.6 percent between 10 and 14 years old, and 29,7 percent of the girls between 15 and 19 years old were married. In the rural area this was 1,9 and 37,8 percent. In ten years, an increase of 12 percent of the girls under the age of twenty had the opportunity to prolong their education.​[57]​ 
	This trend had already been introduced  earlier as table 2.3 indicates. 

2.3 Distribution of Age at first Marriage​[58]​
				
Before 1953		1954-1968		1969-1978
Age at first marriage		
8-14 years old			61,8 %			37,8 %			19,0 %
15-19 years old		35,3 %			56,8 %			70,7 %
20-30 years old		2,9 %			5,4 %			10,3 %


There are a number of other indicators we can use to measure further women’s emancipation in the social area of life. The first is women’s activity in journalism. The number of women’s magazines published through the years indicate a significant development. During the period of 1913 until 1921, only two publications appeared. During the reign of Rezah Shah from 1921 until 1940, ten women’s magazines were published. During the reign of Mohammed Reza Shah, until the CIA coup in 1953, a maximum of 23 publications were issued. Yet in the period between 1953 and 1967, when the Shah’s rule became absolute, a considerable drop back to ten magazines shows the tide in this area has turned for the worse for Iranian women’s journalism. After the Revolution four magazines articulated the position of women: Payam-I-Hajar (message of Hagar), Zan-I-ruz (Today’s women), Farzaneh (wise women) and Zanan (women). These magazines “read the Qur’an like a woman.” It is remarkable that under the Islamic regime, which is often considered to have limited women’s social space more fervently than the previous regime, women had four magazines circulating in which they could express themselves. Secular women’s press was prohibited however.​[59]​  
Meanwhile, a negative trend towards women in social space takes place as well. For the first time in Iran’s history we witness the feminization of violent crimes and a deepening process of the feminization of poverty. Hamid Kusha, a criminal justice specialist, argues that these phenomena were the result of the forced and totalitarian Islamization process in Iran. Women have been involved in anti-state political activities with the result of women being arrested, tortured and executed at the hands of a large network of secret police and revolutionary courts from 1981 until the present. Since 1979 a sharp statistical rise in all kinds of crimes and misdemeanours was noticeable, and even a sharper rise in the rate of women being accused of committing these crimes.​[60]​
	Most feminine crimes have to do with prostitution and drug abuse. Girls who had lost their virginity were denounced by their families and escaped to the big cities where they fell into prostitution. The arrest rates tell us that no other Islamic country had so many women arrested. Since 1979, waves of executions have taken place. The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) published a document which reported the execution of 12,028 persons in 1986 only. More than half of these persons were highly educated or had professions in medicine, engineering, or held an office. The average age was 23 years old. Forty-five women on a list of two-thousand people executed were reported to be pregnant at the time of their execution, but the real figure was probably much higher. In the 1980s and 1990s 120,000 executions have taken place according to PMOI estimates. Many of them were women. Another figure indicating the increasing social injustice committed to women shows that out of 50 persons that were stoned between 1980 and 1997, 41 were women.​[61]​
	Social equality seems far away at this moment. Although the violation of human rights is universal in Iran, women have suffered an unequal share. 

Economic equality and progress of Iranian women
Land reform under the shah made life more difficult for peasant women as their plot became smaller than under the former landlord and the work harder because of the lack of machinery. The men and older sons went to the cities to find a job to gain money to survive, and the women and little children stayed behind to work on the land. Most of their work, including weaving carpets, was unpaid family labour. Therefore women in rural areas were caught up in the structure of the village and did not participate in the later struggle for independence. They were also highly illiterate. In 1966 there were 110,222 unpaid female labourers, while this number increased to 495,723 in 1976. After the Revolution the number decreased to 212,850 in 1986.​[62]​ 
Over the years more and more economically active women transferred from the private sector to a job in the civil service. The total percentage of economically active women in 1976 was 12.9 percent, while 10.2 percent was paid. After the Revolution this percentage dropped to 8.2 in 1986, while 7.3 percent was paid. Over the years following, there was a slight rise in economically active women to 9.3 percent in 1991. In 1996, 90 percent of the Iranian women of working age were economically inactive of which 26,6 percent was still in education and 58 percent were defined as housewives. The post-revolutionary state accepted the right on equal employment for women in theory, but did not facilitate it. Legislation to support women in jobs was supported by female representatives in the Majles but it took some time before a renewed development towards economical equality was set into motion.​[63]​





Causes of women’s emancipation in Iran

The presence of a secular modernizing government
At the beginning of the 1950’s, the communist Tudeh party gained power while the Shah had never been in such a weak position. The forceful actions to change the status of women by the Shah also lacked success because the Iranian critics equated social reform with modernization, and modernization with westernization and imperialism. The Pahlavi rulers believed that the traditional Islamic beliefs were incompatible with a realization of the country’s goals, and were therefore expendable. For many Muslims in Iran this was unacceptable. The Tudeh party offered a communist alternative that opted to be beneficial for women’s status as well. In the Tudeh party programme women were promised political rights and working women were promised equal pay for equal work as well as welfare assistance. The Tudeh party also supported Mohammed Mossadeq, his liberal National Front party, and his nationalistic reforms, which were eschewed by the shah. Mossadeq was elected premier in 1951. The earlier forced modernization that was initiated by the Pahlavi regime was rejected by the public but the more nationalistic centred reforms that would eventually result in modernity as well, promoted by the Tudeh party, were widely accepted, at least among the educated sympathizers. The success of Mossadeq and his National Front was quickly interrupted though. Mossadeq argued that the Shah’s power was excessive and that there was no governmental control over the country’s national resources. The National Front also denounced the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and demanded nationalization of the oil company. The idea of Mossadeq to nationalize the petroleum industry of Iran caused the United States to intervene through a CIA orchestrated coup d’état in favour of the shah.​[65]​
	Pahlavi father and son, Reza Shah and Mohammed Rezah Shah enforced emancipation of women as part of their modernization program. Rezah Shah learned from a visit in 1934 to Atatürk’s Turkey that the road to modernity was to disengage politics from religion. The dark side of the story, which eventually caused the people to rise against this government, was the repressive way this secularization took place. One of the illustrative examples connected to our subject is that in 1936 the shah prohibited the chador, only to be used later as a token of freedom by revolutionary women. During the revolutionary regime, the chador was required for women to wear outside the house, as a symbol of liberation from the dictatorial regime.​[66]​
Other examples of the counter effective result of the government orchestrated secularization of society abound.  One account reports that the presence of agents for women’s rights during the Pahlavi regime actually caused men to begin abuse and beat their women because they felt disrespected by the agents, resulting into reactionary violence. The White Revolution and the shah’s land reforms were expected to make the social situation automatically modern, but actually caused the patriarchal village system to intensify its influence. In addition, like today modern means were used to spread traditional and fundamentalist ideas. Radio and  tapes were used by Ayatollah Khomeini to reach and influence the more  traditional minded villagers.​[67]​ 
	The transformation of the era of nation building into the era of nationalism made the difference Khomeini could built on. The separation of nationalism from the state and the rise of independent oppositional nationalism were supported by the fading trust of the people in the state, and the declining ideal of constitutionalism. Iranians accepted modernity, but in a slightly different way than the Pahlavi rulers had envisioned. Iran’s program of literacy and modernization served not only the interests of modernity and American foreign policy, but also the making of a revolutionary counterculture.​[68]​ 
	In October 1971, the shah celebrated 2500 years of Persian monarchy, with its symbol Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire. Already at that moment Iranian students and dissidents called for a revolution against the constitution under the leadership of Ali Shariati. Ali Shariati, a sociologist, was aware of the global context the revolution had. In Paris he had debated with Frantz Fanon who aimed at using Islamic unity as a weapon against neo-colonialism. Shariati continued in the same tradition as Fanon, using Fatima, daughter of the prophet as a model how women could enter modernity and remake themselves as neither Western nor traditional. He considered women to be at once the greatest hope for and the greatest threat to revolutionary potential. He stated that women should have exactly the same place as men in the factory, at school, and in the parliament. Islamic culture, not Islam, denigrated the image of women. He made a stand against the traditional treatment of a woman “sold” by her father to her husband, her second master, and considered it traffic. Shariati categorized Islam as a social school of thought that recognizes the masses as the basis and the fundamental factor. Women were needed as the essential half of these masses to make an Islamic revolution successful. Mass urban revolt, and anti-Shah protests started as late as 1977, the year in which Shariati was murdered by the SAVAK. The Shah could not stop the trend though, and a political revolution broke loose in the autumn of 1978.​[69]​
At the beginning of the year 1979, the Shah left Iran. Shapour Bakhtiar, leader of the National Front, took over while the United States supported this new secular regime. Yet in a very short period of time, the dream of a secular democratic government was destroyed. In February of the same year, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile and fully started establishing clerical hegemony and the process of Islamization in order to “overthrow the American Power.” Leftist groups were attacked daily after the take over of the headquarters of Tehran by the Fedaeen and Mujahideen in August 1979. By September the last of the three major daily papers that were not controlled by the regime,  Ayandegan, was forced to close down. Half a million people protested, as the National Democratic Front, against the tightening of press censorship, but to no avail. The Islamic Revolutionary Party took control of everything through its nation wide network which was connected to Hezbollah and local religious establishments. In the end, the leaders of the Fedaeen were arrested along with other leftists and the total suppressing of the left began. This suppression could be accomplished by rigging votes, isolating the remaining liberals in the regime, and the attack on universities by Hezbollah. The students that had occupied the university buildings surrendered after twenty-two students had been killed. The universities were closed down because fundamentalists were a minority at these institutions. Thousands of students, most of them women, were arrested and severely beaten and physically assaulted. The failed American rescue attempt gave Khomeini right of speech claiming God protected the regime. What helped the Islamic Revolutionary Party to be this successful were the large sections of the poor population ready to act as bully boys, terrorizing all opposition. This group of people had grown enormously during the Shah’s regime, when money and business had concentrated on oil, forcing small industry to close down, resulting in increasing unemployment. Many people had suffered from the economic policy of the Shah. The failures of forces as the National Front and the Tudeh Party had left a trail of disenchantment. The Clergy rising up against the Shah proclaiming Islam as salvation drew people to tradition and made the Revolution successful. ​[70]​  
The end of the era of secular government had come. The secularization of the elite, and the western type of women’s emancipation, during the Pahlavi regime had not deeply affected the masses. The revolution though, touched all of society. Both males and female participated in the revolution and women began recognizing their strength in numbers. Women’s action groups became active and military training was available for women after Khomeini’s rise to power. Still there were great set backs on the part of women’s emancipation. The effect of the Islamic revolution was total segregation in schools and social life, and in the end, a lowering status of women. According to the Khomeinian interpretation of Islam, women could not be good judges. Therefore the female minister of Education was executed. Many other jobs became unavailable for women as well. Women opposing the chador or hejab were attacked and assaulted in the streets, and were not protected by the government. Fanatics used chemicals and knives or other sharp objects to injure women. In this way Khomeini caused women to be more aware of their position.​[71]​

The formation of women’s groups
Modernity and the issue of women’s equality were integrally linked as new ways to package hidden internal agendas. Modernity and feminism became the vehicles of ideological systems. One of the reasons feminism grouped with new forms of modernism was that the Pahlavi legislation lagged far behind on the progress that individual women made in the social and economic fields of society. The majority of the reforms was of a limited and contradictory nature and did not go deep enough to fundamentally alter the patriarchal basis of the family. ​[72]​
But why did Iranian women support a regime which eliminated the view advances women had made in the preceding decades? Life was easier under the Shah but it was the Shah’s despotism and the control of the regime that made women’s movements join the revolutionary underground. Beforehand, the prospect of overthrowing the Shah seemed to promise democracy and independence. Any other goals, like emancipation of women, were subject to this primary goal. In this period veiling became a token of freedom and independence. Before and during the revolution women started veiling out of solidarity with working class women and as a protest against the Shah’s westernization. Although the Shah’s regime had supported women’s emancipation, it was considered by many as forced modernization from above, indifferent of cultural and national implications. Soon women began to realize that Khomeini’s regime was an attack on all democratic rights, including their equality as well. Prosecution of religious minorities, complete censorship of the media and no free trade were introduced, and women became disappointed in the Islamic Republic.​[73]​ 
Directly after the Revolution, twenty-three different women’s organizations were formed, all having different goals and ideologies. The National Union of Women (Etehad-e Melli-e Zanan) was for instance not cooperating with women’s organizations opposing revolutionary forces and did not see their emancipation separate from the emancipation of the working class. They set demands on the forty-hour workweek, insurance, wages, maternity leave and so forth. Another organization, Emancipation of Women (Anjoman-e Rahai-e Zan), demanded equal rights for women and men in every sphere of society. They wanted cooperation between revolutionary and progressive organizations. The Society for the Awakening of Women (Jam’iat-e Bidari-e Zan) was a pro-China, communist group, fighting against oppression of women. The Women’s Solidarity Committee (Komiteh-e Hambastegi-e Zanan) aimed to bring solidarity among women despite their different religions and ideologies. Their action consisted of struggling for equal rights, studying women’s rights, and initiating cultural activities to make women aware. There were numerous other organizations and societies that were initiated by women to defend their rights and social equality, but they had to cope with severe repression by the new government.​[74]​
“In the early post-revolutionary days the Islamic government sought to exclude women from the public domain and relegate them to the sphere of domesticity.” The traditional role posed on women after the revolution was not accepted by many educated women and this composed the new, post-revolutionary women’s movement in Iran. An example of a compartment of this movement was the Association of Women Lawyers. This association was formed because the mullahs took over the ministry of Justice and protested against female presence. International Women’s Day in March 1979 was another sign that women would not allow such marginalizing to happen without their approval. Fifteen thousand women marched through the streets of Tehran, demanding freedom and equality. Women refused to be limited in any way and organized more public demonstrations, marches, meetings against the veil. One problem was that women began to organize along the diverse political groupings, parties and ideologies, which caused severe fragmentation of the movement. This facilitated governmental attacks on women’s rights. The women’s movement in Iran after the Revolution was poorly organized and not centralized. Another factor that severely hampered the movement was the invasion by Iraq in 1980. The energy that was first directed against the government was now channelled to the war effort. On an intellectual level Iranian women continued their struggle, though. Educated Islamist women located their negotiations in the context of Islam and learned secular women choose to present their protests in terms of human rights. Within these two main categories there were ideological differences, dividing the women’s movement. Some Marxist groups were formed and began to publish newspapers like Equality, Women in Struggle and Women’s Emancipation. These groups were soon driven underground. Still, they managed to organize literacy classes, exhibitions, and political seminars. On the other hand there were also some right-wing women’s organizations to boost the regime’s influence. In June 1981 a new wave of repression of women’s initiatives by the state caused many voices to grow silent. A series of executions and arrests in the summer almost stopped all publications. Most Iranian women’s organizations have been in exile ever since.​[75]​

War
During the period from 1950 until the present, in Iran there has been a latent internal and external threat of conflict. The internal threat was initiated by the political unrest described above. The external threat of conflict came from Iran’s position of influence in the Persian Gulf and the oil industry linked to the region. Also longstanding border issues with Iraq and the aim of undermining authority by stirring up ethnic and religious conflict caused rivalry between countries. During the reign of the Shah, a pact between Saddam Hussein and the Pahlavi regime had brought these tensions under control. Yet as soon as the Revolution had taken place, conflict was stirred up and the Iraqi invasion of Iran followed soon afterwards. From 1980 until 1988, the Iraq-Iran war raged.​[76]​
	In western countries and in Turkey at the start of the twentieth century, the presence of war has had a stimulating effect on the economic participation of women. In the second half of the twentieth century the presence of war had a devastating and negative effect on women’s emancipation. As a consequence of the war and the bad international relations with the West following the revolution, a grave economic depression hit Iran. Food distribution in Iran went through a crisis. From questionnaires can be derived that under the influence of the patriarchal structure of the family, women have suffered most from these circumstances, as husbands and brothers were fed before mothers and daughters were. As the tension of war and the economic depression increased, so did the tension of oppression of Iranian women. This is also indicated by the difference of the rigidity of gender division in different social groups. When women were higher on the social and economic ladder, they had more egalitarian attitudes. During the years of war, this development was countered because war and economic disaster have been largely intertwined.​[77]​ 

Prospering Economy
From 1960 until the Revolution, Iran had experienced rapid economic growth. In the two decades before the Revolution, the country had been systematically transformed from “a largely agrarian country and stagnant economy into a modern, progressive society.” The changes initiated by the Pahlavi regime to alter the tradition-bound socio-economic order were the result of public planning and governmental economic guidance. Urbanization, industrialization, and diversification were stimulated from above. Rapid economic growth, modernization of the economic sectors, improved social welfare, and integration into the global economy became policy priorities.​[78]​
	This policy of renewal was backed by the growing revenues from oil. The government invested in infrastructure and industry and helped to create a successful private sector. Private investments increased as well, and the public sector played an advancing role in the Iranian economy. The third measure in the Shah’s statement of the ‘White Revolution’ promised that state enterprises would be sold to the public. In contrast to many Western European countries after the Second World War, Iran did not need the impetus of foreign investment or borrowing to accomplish the development of the economy, because it was literally fueled by national natural resources. The export of crude oil rose from around 1 million barrels per day in 1963 to approximately 4 million barrels per day in 1971.​[79]​
	The result of all these developments was an average annual rate of the gross domestic investment of 16 percent, reaching 33 percent of the Gross Domestic Product in 1977/78. Public consumption rose by almost 18 percent annually, and private consumption rose to 10 percent. Personal income went up 8 percent per year on average, and all sectors of economy showed remarkable expansion. Inflation was kept low at 2.5 percent between 1960 and 1967. In the years following, inflation was 3.7 percent. Poverty decreased, but the gap between rural and urban incomes did not change much.​[80]​
	By the end of 1975 the Iranian economy was hit by the declining global demand for oil. By the close of the fifth five-year plan in 1978, the economy still showed considerable growth, yet the revenues from oil reflected a clear drop back. The plans’ results so far had been very satisfactory. The new government of 1977 proposed new plans with the emphasis on social welfare, development of alternative sources of energy and decreased independence of oil, improved distribution of income, and many more interventions to move the country into a higher level of economic welfare and stability. The sixth plan of 1978 proved to be impossible because of a lack of finances and an overambitious program. The Iranian government never had the chance to propose an alternative plan because of the political disturbances which eventually led to the Revolution. Even if one takes into account the drop backs and short fallings of the economic development under the Shah, overall, the Iranian economic development before 1979 was one of the greatest success stories in that period.​[81]​
	The groups supporting the Revolutionary regime had one thing in common: they opposed the Shah’s policy and dependence on the West. The economic growth of the past years was considered fake as it had been dependent on the exorbitant export of oil and had caused socio-economic inequality increased among the Iranian population. “The economy’s ‘growth first, redistribution later’ strategy caused industries and urban centers to gain at the expense of agriculture and rural areas.” Although this was an accurate analysis, no one could come up with an acceptable alternative economic program that all political parties could agree on. After Khomeini had eradicated all opposition groups, the struggle to find an appropriate alternative economic policy, was no longer an issue. Economic growth was considered by him to be secondary to man’s intellectual, cultural, and spiritual development. Islamic economics were introduced.​[82]​
	The basic ideas of the new economic policy were aimed at the elimination of poverty, the independence of foreign domination, economic growth for the purpose of raising per capita output, curbing inflation, fair distribution, and a drive towards self-sufficiency. This last aim was exactly opposed to the former economic planning which had caused economic growth. In the years after the introduction of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian economy experienced periods of decline, but also some years of growth. The economic stagnation and backlash were mostly due to indirect consequences of foreign policy. After the regime change, wages kept rising, but the increase of personal income could not keep up with the inflation. After the Iraqi invasion, oil production declined, and consumer prices kept rising.  









3. Women’s Emancipation in Iraq





Although Iraq is at the moment a hot issue in the media, the situation of Iraqi women has remained fairly unexposed. The interference of the United States in Iraq has rather worsened the situation for women than that it brought the promised democracy, equality, and human rights. The ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ has fully revived in many aspects. In this chapter I would like to show that, although the regime of Saddam Hussein was far from ideal, it has offered more benefits to women than any other regime in Iraq, before or after. Today, mothers who can read have daughters who cannot, and the older generation often displays more modern views than the younger.​[85]​ 

Indicators of Women’s Emancipation in Iraq

Legal equality and progress of Iraqi Women
The Iraqi Civil Code, modelled after the Egyptian Civil Code, became effective on September 8, 1953. Shari’a law was an important part of this code, but it did not include any further provisions regarding family law and women’s right. Under the Ba’th regime in the 1970s, laws were designed that assigned rights and preferential treatment to women. The principle of equality between the sexes was introduced, including the prohibition of discrimination in employment. Special provisions were introduced for women like maternity leave laws, good working conditions for women, childcare, baby-feeding breaks, and health security. Family Laws and Legislation introduced specific laws on marriage. From that moment on, marriage needed consent of both parties. Civil marriage became obligatory, and polygamy could only take place with the consent of the first wife. Divorce laws became more equal for both parties and other criminal justice laws forbade the killing of wives being blamed of honour crimes. Children were put under custody of the mother until they were 10 years old, except when the judge thought the mother was not able take care of them. Child custody could be prolonged, and after that the child could chose which parent it desired to live with. In case of an inheritance, daughters had the right to inherit equally with their brothers.​[86]​ 
The Agrarian Reform Act of 1970 stated that women had the right of economic independence. The Unified Labor Code of 1970 equalized the status of men and women employees on all counts. However, this right was not seriously observed until the war, as we will later see in the economic equality part of this chapter. A 1978 law did away with forced marriages, permitted divorce, and outlawed polygamy. Women got full retirement rights early on, aimed at women of 15 years work experience, thirty years old and having three children. In the same year, fully paid maternity leave was introduced as well. A last important law on behalf of women’s equality to men was introduced in 1993, as the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against women. As a result, an act of gender-based violence could be prosecuted. Although the Islamic fundamentalist sentiment was not a serious issue in Iraq, in practice, Iraqi women were often still bound by family and Shari’a based rules and laws that, in effect, relegated them to secondary status.​[87]​
The Code of Personal Status as amended in 1978 should not be understood in western terms of ‘liberalizing’ women. While on personal level the patriarchal influence was undermined, it strengthened the state’s patriarchal control over the family. The state could manipulate the persistence of the patriarchal pattern of gender relations and sex roles. For instance, during the second half of the Iraq-Iran war, women were more or less forced into the motherhood role by the state through laws on early retirement. Laws and legislation in general were not only important instruments of social change; when their implementation involved considerable public resources, they also became a key for social transformation. Although great progress in legal equality was made in theory, the influence on the level of women’s lives remained limited as a consequence of patriarchal structures, whether intended by the family or by the state.​[88]​





Educational equality and progress of Iraqi Women
During the Ba’th regime, in contradiction to the former regime, attendance of primary school became compulsory for girls. Doreen Ingrams says in 1983 that “gone are the days when girls in Iraq went into seclusion and wearing veils at the age of eleven, although it is still ‘not done’ for girls to play with boys after that age.” At intermediate educational level, the schools were segregated. The same subjects were taught to boys and girls alike, with some minor exceptions. A girl was also permitted to attend higher education for free at state colleges and universities. The level of their subsequent higher education depended on the percentage of correct answers in the final examination.​[89]​
The older generation of women received new prospects of educational equality too. In 1971, the Illiteracy Eradication Law was issued as a consequence of the government’s modernization policy. An official campaign was set in motion in 1978, to deal with the general illiteracy in Iraq. All illiterate adults from 15-45 years old, both male and female, had to participate. This campaign was supported by regional literacy centres, schooling programs for adults, children’s day-care service in order to release mothers of their duties, travelling schools for nomads, and daily television courses. In 1977, prior to campaign, 70.7 percent of the illiterate population was female. By the end of 1987, 75 percent of the Iraqi females had become literate. Another report shows that the total illiteracy percentage was 55 percent in 1980 and had dropped to 11 percent of the Iraqi population in 1988. The gap between the literacy of Iraqi men and women had diminished dramatically. In 1980 37 percent of all men had been illiterate, and 73 percent of all women. In 1988 only 9.8 percent of the males and 12.5 percent of the females remained illiterate, which left an inequality of literacy of less than 3 percent.​[90]​
School enrolment of girls increased likewise. The female enrolment in primary school was 30 percent in the mid 1970s, and it rose to 43 percent in 1979. In 1988, 45.1 percent of the primary school attendants was female, the highest percentage ever. In 2001 and 2005, 44 percent of all primary school attendants were female. Female access to education was still not equal to that of males, even though significant progress has been made under the Ba’th regime. The remaining inequality was probably due to the patriarchal system of the household, particularly in the rural area. Sources on literacy indicate that between 1988 and 2001 there have been major set backs in the progress towards educational equality. ​[91]​
By the year 2000, under the economic sanctions of the UN, illiteracy among adults in Iraq was far higher than it had been in the 1970s. Seventy-seven percent of the Iraqi women were illiterate, which was the highest percentage among Middle Eastern countries. Private primary schools began to emerge after the impositions of the sanctions, but many families could not even meet basic needs as food. The female enrolment in secondary school shows that political tendencies have influenced the participation rate. In 1990, 36 percent of all students were female. In 1996 this had declined to 32 percent, while in 2000 the percentage climbed up to 38.5 percent, and dropped to 29 percent in 2003. As a consequence of the economic sanctions after the Gulf war and the American invasion, the participation rate dropped. In higher education no such fluctuation is detectable. In 1970, 22 percent of the students enrolled were female. This number was raised to 31.4 percent in 1980. In the years following, the female percentage further increased to around 35 percent; in 1998 it was 34.8 percent and in 2005 it was 36 percent.​[92]​
	Since 1990, as a consequence of the low wages in the public sector, the quality of Iraqi education had declined quickly. Although travelling abroad was prohibited, people at the passport office were often bribed and the universities began to lose their teachers. Mainly female students suffered as a consequence of the increasing amount of classes cancelled. If their families found out, they were discouraged to continue their education. By 1998 the government tried to turn the tide by raising teacher’s salaries and stimulating teacher training. However, the situation remained largely unchanged. At the same time, teachers were bribed by rich students to pass exams. As the quality of high school teachers detoriated, and the exam level remained the same, private teachers were increasingly necessary. Girls who could not afford them often failed to go to university. Another reason why girls failed to be admitted was that students had to score higher grades to be admitted to a state-sponsored university than when attending a private college. Often boys were a priority to parents, and most often they invested all their money in their son’s private education while girls had to get through alone. ​[93]​
	In the educational area, major progress has been made for women’s equality in the first period of the Ba’th regime. Later on, setbacks have taken place and at this moment we cannot speak of educational equality of Iraqi women. 

Political equality and progress of Iraqi Women
After the fall of the monarchy, in theory, there was nothing to prevent women being elected to the Assembly as the Constitution did not specifically exclude women from political rights. Women had the right to vote at eighteen, like men, and they were free to come forward as a candidate. In the 1980 elections, 16 women were elected out of 250 members of the National Assembly, 6.4 percent, and that was a higher percentage of female delegates than in the British Parliament at that moment. In 1995 the percentage of female delegates rose to 11 percent, but it was reduced again to 8 percent in 2000. Following the US invasion in March 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) attempted to elevate Iraqi women’s status by supporting their political participation. In 2005, 32 percent of the parliamentary representatives were women. This percentage dropped to 26 percent from 2006 onwards until the present. In current Iraq, women use their theoretical political equality more effectively, than in many other Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, we should notice the recent high participation of women in government is consolidated by the American military presence in Iraq. The democratic government that was installed under foreign pressure is still far from stability and independence.​[94]​ 

Social equality and progress of Iraqi Women
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Iraqi universities were not segregated, but the obedience to parents was great, and there was no such thing as dating. Marriages still were nearly always arranged. Marriage and motherhood had also remained the ultimate goals of most Iraqi girls. Doreen Ingrams stated in 1983 that “in Iraq it is at once evident that the women have come a long way along the road of emancipation, much further than in many other parts of the world.” With Iraqi women’s emancipation, had grown self-confidence and “women did not need to be militant in their struggle as they had full governmental support.” This had progressive consequences for the social position of women. Because so many women were out shopping or going to and from their work in the towns of Iraq, men became less sex-conscious. Although traditionalism and women’s clothes differed per city, the negative attitude towards women in Iraq became something of the past, according to Ingrams. Another socially equalizing factor was that the cost of living in Iraq was high, and it was usual for both husband and wife to work. Still, husbands considered it their duty to be independent of their wife’s income. A last indicator of growing social equality of women in that period was the free local Family Planning Centre. There was no longer a taboo on birth control.​[95]​ 
The social taboo of women working in certain professions was increasingly lifted. In the Iraq of 1983, as in other countries, women became lawyers, doctors, business women, scientists, civil servants, politicians, accountants, journalists, artists, singers, writers and actresses. Yet not all women had the opportunity to develop themselves in such a way.​[96]​
An interview based study on Iraqi women by Sana Al-Khayyat shows us that not all social equality can be measured by statistics. Although her perspective on women’s emancipation is of unusual pessimistic tone, her findings can function as a good counterweight to the foregoing analysis of Ingrams, which indicated a bright future of women’s emancipation in Iraq. Al-Khayyat argues that at the moment of her writing, in Iraq, women’s oppression within the family is fairly universal. Although she believes that paid work has given Iraqi women independence, she is concerned by the fact that, traditionally, a woman is isolated in her home and considered good when she is obedient. Not one of her interviewees was happy in her marriage and the expression of love was considered by the women that were interviewed, a ‘Western’ and thus a despicable notion. Sex was considered a hated duty and women often sought their refuge in religion. According to Al-Khayyat, the idea of independence did not exist in Iraq, and least for women, as it existed for women in the West.​[97]​
By looking at the same subjects I use as indicators of women’s emancipation, which Al-Khayyat uses as causal factors for women’s emancipation, she continues her discourse. Has education made a difference? From the answers of the Iraqi women she spoke with she derived the notion that getting a degree meant less chance for a husband and respectability in society. Marriage remained the ultimate goal for women, educated or not. Many educated women stopped veiling though, yet it is not clear to what extent this was an expression of independence or emancipation. The majority of the respondents did not see their job as a means of acquiring status. In most cases women worked because they needed the money, but also because they wanted to get out of the house sometimes. It gave them a little more power. The majority of urban women received education and participated in the workforce. Although their consciousness had been raised, this had merely added anxiety and complexity in their lives. Rural and lower class women suffered from physical violence, higher class educated women from mental violence of their husband and family. From Al Khayyat’s research, it appears that Iraqi women in general were speaking out against themselves and against their equality. On the whole, they looked down on women and did not approve of working under them. From this can be derived that many women dealt with psychological issues regarding to their self-esteem and equality. The group of fifty women that was interviewed to come to these conclusions cannot possibly represent all Iraqi women regarding these problems, but it does reflect there were still social issues that influenced women’s lives under the Ba’th regime. Perhaps this is the result of living in a society where the combination of traditional ideas and modern practices cause confusion and conflict.​[98]​
Because of the devastating economic effects of the sanctions of 1991, normal street crime had increased, and it was no longer safe for women to travel alone. They were dependent on male relatives to bring them to and pick them up from school or work. In the 1970s, the prospects for Iraqi women looked bright, but during the 1990s, women became increasingly victimized in all kinds of ways. Large numbers of women resorted to veiling or shapeless garments and covered their heads with scarves. To many women this felt reassuring rather than it was an expression of religious dedication. Today, we can see the same development in the streets of Baghdad as a consequence of the national chaos that followed the American invasion. Women are no longer safe, and social equality is on the reverse.​[99]​

Economic equality and progress of Iraqi Women
Female labour participation increased in the first period of the successful Ba’th government. The female part of the national working force rose from 4 percent in 1967 to 17.5 percent in 1977. Women were represented in all economic sectors, but mostly in agriculture, manufacturing industry, banking, insurance, and the service sector. The percentage of female employees in the public sector steadily rose from 14.8 percent in 1968 to 22.5 percent in 1980. Many women became hired as a teacher. Whereas in 1968 34.9 percent of the teachers in primary school were female, in 1987 this number had almost doubled to 67 percent female teachers. In higher education the same development is noticeable as over the same period the percentage has increased from 11.2 percent to 22 percent. In 1987 almost half, 48.2 percent, of the economic activities in agriculture were performed by women. In the service sector 26.1 percent of the labour was performed by women, in banking and insurance it was 37.9 percent, and in industry it was 20.5 percent. In the years between 1977 and 1987 there was also a growth of the educated female workforce, but there was a decline of women’s participation in uneducated work like work in agriculture and production. Partly this was due to the war which drew many men to the front and left vacancies in skilled work like in the sector of public office.​[100]​ 
In 1980 the number of university educated women employed was virtually equal to the total number of graduated women. Forty-six percent of all teachers, 29 percent of all doctors, 46 percent of all dentists, 70 percent of all pharmacists, 14 percent of all factory employees, and 16 percent of civil servants were female graduates. In 1975 women had accounted for 12 percent of the labour force, but not every woman in the labour force received a salary. By 1988, 23 percent of the labour force was female, and the majority received a salary. The period from 1981 until 1985 was also the only period in Iraqi history in which more women than men were appointed to the public sector. In 1987 there was a drop in the female percentage of the total work force, which is estimated at 11.7 percent. In the following year this percentage rises again, and in 1990, until before the sanctions, women were responsible for 24 percent of the work performed in Iraq. At the same time, most of this work was yet again unskilled agricultural work. Iraq, like Turkey and Egypt, has always had a rather liberal attitude towards women in the professions, but again like Turkey and Egypt, has had limited success in engaging females in larger numbers at the lower education levels. This changed slowly, and also slowly changed the composition of the labour force. Overall, in this period women made great progress in economic participation.​[101]​
Working in the private sector included more social constraints for women because the family often disagreed with such a dishonouring job. After graduating, women often failed to find a job corresponding to their degree. Private employers did not hire women because it would harm their reputation, but it was very normal for women to work in the public sector. In Baghdad in 1997, 48.9 percent of the employees in the public sector were female, and this percentage slightly grew the year after that.​[102]​
	United Nations Procurement Division announced in 2002 that the level of Iraqi women’s employment had declined from 24 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2000. The impact of the United Nation’s economic sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War in 1990 had direct influence on the economic equality of Iraqi women and on gender relations inside the family. Before the sanctions women were able to have an independent, decent life, while working hard. After the sanctions women lost their jobs because of the worsening economic situation in Iraq, and their income was not sufficient to buy enough food for their families. Many more modern-minded husbands had died in the war, and the women left behind stood alone. They were often pressured by their families to move in with them again. Women needed their brother’s and/or father’s help to survive. This meant that women were forced into an economic dependent position again.​[103]​









Causes of women’s emancipation in Iraq

The presence of a secular modernizing government
During the evolution of the nation-state of Iraq at the end of the colonial era, women’s issues were not a central topic. The political tensions left no room for active promotion of the women’s cause and little literature is available on Iraqi women in that period. The undercurrents of rebellion had been gaining strength over the years and finally erupted on 14 July 1958 when the royal family was killed and Iraq was declared a republic. A group of ‘Free Officers’ had moved swiftly in a revolution that put an end to the monarchy in Iraq. After that coup, counter coups followed until the Ba’th Party took control under President Al Bakr on 17 July 1968, and Iraq enjoyed a period of stability. The Ba’thist group evolved from the elite of the minority Sunni sect and rose to power on the back of a nationalist, pan-Arabic, and relatively secular ideology: the Ba’th. They saw their role as connected to the transnational pan-Arab movement and as apostles of political and social victories. Arabism, not Islam was the spirit of the Ba’th revolution, having unity, freedom and socialism as its ideal. They focused on the replacement of the traditional, urban, ruling elite with an entire new social group with its roots in lower and middle class. The ultimate goal was to build a new society and generation through the reform of the education system, and to shift from a traditional society to a modern society. The educational policy of the party was strengthened by the party’s aim for social justice, equality of all citizens, and free education for all citizens. Five-year plans had to speed up the production of students useful to industrial, agricultural, and services plans that would lead society to a new stage of modernity. As a consequence of these ideals, women’s emancipation came to the front.​[105]​
The Party’s policy of equality for women was expressed at its first conference in article 12 of the main resolution. Arab women should enjoy complete civil rights that are equal to men’s rights. The party made an effort of raising women’s level of consciousness. For national revolutionary socialists, women’s liberation constituted not only a human necessity, but a democratic imperative as well. Women’s participation was seen as one of the most essential goals for building a modern democratic society. The party’s ideology focused on the emancipation of women as it was needed ‘to battle against backwardness as one half of society consists of women.’ This kind of argumentation was apparently quite popular as we have heard this reason for women’s emancipation before in the rhetoric used by the Shah and also by the Revolutionary forces in Iran.​[106]​
Many of the effective gains women had acquired as a consequence of governmental support during the 1980s were lost after the economic depression following the economic sanctions issued by the United Nations in the 1990s. Although the government was officially secular, political and social pressure increased. Iraqis increasingly turned to religion for solace, sharpening the divide between Shi’ite Muslims, 60 percent of the population, and Sunni Muslims, 35 percent of the population. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, launched a faith campaign, discrediting the government’s secular character, which enraged the Shi’ite part of the population. Soon, attracting the poor, the Shi’ites gained popularity over the dictator leading to domestic violence and unrest.​[107]​
After the American invasion of Iraq, political and religious struggles broke loose and have continued until the present day. The swift installation of a democracy has turned out to be an illusion. Iraqi women activists have put great efforts in campaigns to protect the secular provisions of the 1978 Code of Personal Status, but these attempts have faced strong opposition in the ‘new’ political structure of Iraq. These struggles imply that the equality of sexes have to be negotiated within Islam. However, the current sectarian divisions and religious fundamentalism leave a path clear for various religious extremists to curtail women’s rights. Iraq is in the situation that secular women’s rights are considered as un-Islamic and culturally and religiously alien to the Iraqi society. However there is an increasing hope that when Iraq regains integrity and independence, and re-establishes its economic strength, this will enable a more acceptable environment for a progressive interpretation and consolidation of women’s human rights and family laws in the country’s new constitution, as well as their enforcement on the ground.​[108]​

The formation of women’s groups
After the Second World War, there was nothing to prevent women being elected to the Assembly as the Constitution did not specifically exclude women from political rights. But in practice no attempt was made to implement women’s rights. This led the Women’s Union in 1952 to submit a memorandum addressed to the presidents of the two Houses of Parliament demanding reforms. “We urgently demand that the Iraqi Government recognizes the political, economic and social equality of men and women,” they said. “The Constitution stipulates that women are equal in the payment of taxes, and therefore they should have equal political rights.” The Iraqi Women’s League was founded in 1952, but forced underground by Saddam Hussein soon after the Ba’th Party took over in 1968. Its members kept in touch as exiles and recently reconstituted the league in Baghdad with the aim of women’s involvement in the new founded government.​[109]​
Although the Ba’th party usurped political freedom, for the sake of nationalism and the secular approach, women’s advancement was reflected by the establishment of the soviet- style General Federation of Iraqi women in 1969. In 1981 the federation had half a million members who were expected to be sympathetic towards the Ba’th party. After the Iraq-Iran war, women’s organizations were strong and vocal on the political scene. They delivered the message to the regime that it should “go create jobs – don’t take ours.”​[110]​
	Although women’s organizations have represented women in Iraqi society, without the government’s consent, hardly any action in favour of emancipation was possible. 

Absence of War
When Saddam Hussein became president, he ignited a war with Iran. The state’s attitude to women was ambivalent during this period. From 1980 until 1985 they were invited to participate more actively in production and labour force. It seemed as though the same emancipatory development took place through the presence of war as had been the case in Western Europe and the United States. By the end of the war, 21 percent of the total active economic male population was on the battlefield. The huge costs of the war needed to be compensated with a cheaper workforce and women were cheaper than men. Women functioned also as substitutes for the male workforce drawn away to the front. A contradictory movement was set in motion from 1986 until 1990. Women were directed by the government to concentrate on their “natural role” in order to give birth to more civil servants. A minimum of five children was set as a standard.  This last policy was also a consequence of the redistribution of the female labour force. The female component of the workforce declined from 17.5 percent in 1977 to 11.7 percent in 1987. Female unemployment increased from 2.2 percent to 7.6 percent. The numbers of female workers in different economic activities appear to have been heavily influenced by the state, shifting its priorities in allocations of public investments, as well.​[111]​
Conditions for Iraqi women have certainly deteriorated since the subsequent war in the Persian Gulf in 1991. One example of how war influenced women’s emancipation in a negative way, is the destruction of educational establishments. Schools were damaged during the Gulf war, but could not be repaired because of the financial constraints of the economic sanctions issued by the UN. Six hundred forty-five million US dollar was needed for the essential repairing of the schools and only 2.4 million dollar was spent on Iraq’s education infrastructure. The damage had extended to a whole generation of students, teachers and academic institutions. In the analysis of women’s educational equality we have seen that after or during periods of war in Iraq, for instance after 1990 and 2003, women’s participation in education dropped. Also a serious shortage of good and up to date literature left students aware of the poor quality of their education. An increasing number of university teachers left for America or Europe for better prospects leaving many students without any.​[112]​
Since the latest war experience of March 2003, the humanitarian and political situation in Iraq changed dramatically for the worse. The American invasion was marketed as the harbinger of democracy, ‘liberating’ Iraqi women. However, women’s lives were further reduced to a sheer struggle for survival. The American dismantling of the Iraqi government and police force left the country open to criminals and organized crime. Iraqi women were kidnapped more than ever. Women arrested by American soldiers, were detained, abused and tortured. Even after the international attention for the Abu Ghraib scandal, Human Rights Watch reported an increase of women being raped by American soldiers, which will often lead to their death if they return home.​[113]​

Prospering Economy
Iraq was mainly dependent on the export of oil, the country’s biggest industry. The nationalization of the Iraqi Oil Company in 1972 boosted the programme of economical growth and directed the economy away from agriculture towards industry. Mass urbanization followed. Iraqi women and their role in this process were acknowledged in the realization of a ‘modern’ society. The ABSP (Arab Ba’th Socialist Party) Doctrine of 1974 stated that institutions were obliged to adopt specific economic, social, and cultural legislations and programmes aiming at promoting and encouraging women’s participation in the country’s economic development through their activity in work, education, cultural, political, and social domain. The United Nations backed these state-building projects. In 1979 Vice President Saddam Hussein became president.​[114]​
By the end of the 1970s, Iraq had become the second largest oil-exporting country after Saudi-Arabia in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). During the 1970s and 1980s the state directed its energies extensively towards state- and nation-building programmes. This led to the emergence of a large middle class that owed its very existence to the state directed work force programs. Prices were stabilized by state subsidy and minimum wages greatly increased. Development in both economic efficiency and equity was visible.​[115]​  
The UN’s response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was a complete ban on trade with Iraq, exempting medicine and humanitarian help like foodstuffs. The fall of the oil export had a tremendous effect on all aspects of life in Iraq. The six week bombing campaign that began on 16 January 1991 damaged almost every facility in the life of an Iraqi civilian, from communication networks to oil pipelines, and from hospitals to food warehouses. Most means of modern life were destroyed. The damage was estimated at 232 billion US dollars. After that, the ‘Oil for Food’ (OFF) program was released by the UN, limiting oil export dramatically. In the following years more oil export was permitted.​[116]​
From May 1996 until May 2003, Iraq had over US$100 billion worth of oil transactions through UN-controlled sales. However, only US$37 billion worth of contracts for food and services were approved by the UN Secretariat. The Volcker Commission investigated this scandal and discovered that the UN was to blame in many aspects. The cruel irony however was that Saddam Hussein and his associates, over more than thirteen years of sanctions, grew obscenely rich as a direct result of sanctions that were meant to punish them. While these illicit crimes were taking place, Iraq’s economy and its helpless civilians were made to suffer hunger, disease, and death as a result of those very sanctions that were said to be helping them.​[117]​ 
In the meanwhile, the Iraqi Dinar suffered heavy inflation. The food prices were 4000 times higher in 1995 than in 1991. In 1998 four million Iraqis were, according to the UN Department of Humanitarian Panel, living in extreme poverty. The OFF program was condemned by many UN coordinators. Because of the sanctions, wages could no longer cover the basic needs. From a questionnaire it appeared that the sanctions had devastating effects on women’s salaries. For university lecturers it meant they had to make a living off, converted, ten US dollars per month in 2002. As this was obviously insufficient, they often offered personal tuition in return for money. Women working as a janitor made 1 dollar and fifty cents per month and had to survive without complementary income. While many suffered, there was also a rich upper class in which women could earn up to 250 dollars a month as a hairdresser or dentist in family enterprises in the private sector in that same period.​[118]​
 	 Another alarming phenomenon is the increasing number of street children. For young girls the only way to avoid this fate was to be married as a second or third wife because their families could not afford to keep them any longer. Any marriage was better than begging. The desperate economic situation of the country has led to absence of effective state control on society which has led to countless unrestrained forms of abuse of young females such as ‘selling’ juvenile girls into unofficial polygamous marriages, prostitution, and other brutal methods of earning informal incomes. 
	Electricity and sanitary facilities have not been restored to pre-Gulf war conditions and medical facilities have been poor ever since the sanctions. From 1990 until 1997, an estimated 500,000 children under five have died, often because of malnutrition and disease. In these times of political and economic crisis, women, regardless of their social and educational background, became subject to male institutionalized power. The UN sanctions curtailed their rights and equality by strengthening social attitudes that described women as ‘weak’ and ‘dependent’ and in need of male protection.  The implications for women, especially breadwinners, were grave. The level of suffering of the weakest – women and children – under these measures was unique. The economic sanctions stopped the sale of oil, which accounted for 61 percent of the national export. The import was restricted as well while, usually, 75 percent of the foodstuffs were imported. The sanctions did not contribute to the removal of Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction were never found. The sanctions just affected the civil society and population. The invasion of 2003 led Iraq to sink into another long-lasting conflict, with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi people losing their lives and further destruction of the country’s civilian infrastructure. 
All women were hit by the sanctions, middle class educated women were pushed back home, women of lower class were put in the situation of economic insecurity and outright poverty, the most disadvantaged were the female breadwinners, who were often forced into ill-conceived and illegal marriages.​[119]​




During the Ba’th regime considerable progress towards women’s emancipation had been made. In many areas of life women experienced increasing equality. Laws were made to prohibit discrimination against women at work. A trend towards educational equality was set in motion through forced attendance of school for girls and literacy programs for older women. The political equality of women has not been developed much under the Ba’th regime, and has reached a more satisfactory rate after the invasion by the Americans, yet it is the question how stable this development is. The economic problems occurring in the second half of the Ba’th era caused one aspect of social equality to develop when the salaries of both husband and wife were needed to survive. When the problems continued to exist and the situation grew worse, it tended to have the reverse effect however. Still, women have always occupied a considerable part of the labour market until the American invasion. After that, women’s employment has declined. 




4. Women’s Emancipation in Turkey





Turkey is rightly considered one of the most progressive and modern countries in the Middle East. As we have seen in the previous chapters, emancipation often seems to be linked to secularism. Turkey is the most secular of our three cases, so based on that assumption, Turkey should have experienced women’s emancipation to the greatest extent. In this chapter we will discover that the relationship between emancipation and secularism turns out to be a bit more complicated than that. 

Indicators of women’s emancipation in Turkey

Legal equality and progress of Turkish Women
In the Turkish Republic of the 1950s the legal changes that were produced under Atatürk from 1923 until 1938 in favour women’s rights were still effective. Polygamy and marriage without consent of both partners were illegal. Divorce was equally obtainable by either party. Inheritance rights were equaled for male and female heirs. The principle of equal pay for equal work regardless of sex was established. Women kept the right to own and dispose property. The right to vote was granted to women. Compulsory and free primary education for all children was instituted by these laws. Adult illiteracy lessons were made available throughout the country for both men and women. Lastly, women were allowed to enter the army. At the start of the period from 1950 until the present, in theory, Turkish women already had almost complete legal equality with men. Until 2001 no changes were made to the 1923 laws regarding equality between men and women.​[121]​
Although the Turkish civil code seemed to promote equality of the sexes very explicitly, there are some laws which clearly ascribe a secondary status to women, mostly in the area of family law. The law was based on the Swiss Civil Code and therefore reflects traditional European values. This means that legally, there is no absolute equality between husbands and wives. One example of this inequality was that if a woman wanted to work outdoors, she had to have her husband’s consent, according to article 159. These kinds of laws have been criticized by the press and feminist groups in the 1980s.​[122]​ 
Contradictions persisted between the equal status ascribed to men and women in the constitution, and some articles in Turkish law undermined that equality. These anomalies formed the basis of a number of demands made at a congress organized by 27 women’s organizations in December 1975. The focus of this congress centred on the laws relating to the institution of marriage, which apportioned the greater part of power and control to the husband. The husband had the last word in any disagreement. Although women in Turkey had won more complete legal and political equality with men than many of their European sisters in the first half of the twentieth century, complete legal equality had not yet been reached in the following half century.​[123]​
In 2001, some amendments were made to the 1923 family laws in the civil code. Some examples can illustrate the fact that more progress to legal equality has been made in the twenty-first century. Changes to article 186 of the Turkish Civil Code make that the husband no longer automatically the head of the family.  Both men and women are given equal status within marriage and both are able to represent the family in legal matters, according to article 188. The obligation to obtain permission from the other spouse before choosing a profession or a job was abolished. However, in the choice and pursuit of professions, the welfare and benefit of the unity of marriage should be taken into consideration, says article 192. These and some more amendments that are in agreement with legal equality between men and women were approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on November 27, 2001, and were promulgated by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer as published in the Official Gazette on December 8, 2001.​[124]​

Educational equality and progress of Turkish Women
Under Atatürk the plan of transmitting state ideology through the educational system was set into motion. The expansion and progress of the national educational system was not without problems however. Illiteracy was combated in various ways. Military service was used for this aim. Military service was compulsory for men, and illiterate peasants were educated to read and write in a few months during their service to the state. In the agricultural sector there was a low attendance of agricultural education along with high drop-out rates. The centralization of the educational system had to prevent this and had to keep landlords of local boards from trying to keep the people ignorantly imprisoned in the feudal system. The educational efforts of the state were also aimed at women because they needed to become better mothers. Women were educated to be mothers of a modern, civilized, nation. Mixed schooling was introduced because it was thought to cause the girls to be motivated and ambitious. This may have worked as the attendance of girls grew far more rapidly than the participation rate of boys. Girls remained a minority being 32.75 percent of the primary school attendants in 1938. At high school, girls made up 23.51 percent in the same period. By 1935 only 16 percent of all Turkish girls attended a school.​[125]​ 
One reason for low school attendance in the rural area was that the villagers were offended by the teacher sent by the ministry of education. They often felt like the teacher looked down on them, and thereby, the local imam was held in higher esteem. The imam taught the village children how to pray and was involved in almost every aspect of life. Farmers were reluctant to send their children to school while they could use them at home doing domestic and agricultural work. A last reason was that in the minds of the villagers, no worthwhile benefits seemed to be attached to education. Agriculture had remained the same for ages, and so had the standard of living. As soon as the Ministry of Education became aware of this problem, it started to use a method that was better adapted to the cultural and social environment of the Turkish citizens living in a rural area. Ex-militaries with a village background were trained in more village-related education which was directly connected to the Ministry of Agriculture and put to work in the villages as teachers.​[126]​ 
The method of more village-related education seems to have been effective as the participation rate has gradually risen ever since. Still, during the second half of the twentieth century progress had to be made on behalf of the educational equality of women. During the 1960s and 1970s the majority of graduates from the Girl’s Technical Schools did not enter employment that was based on the education they had received. Only 30 percent worked in a position that demanded their education rate. Forty-one percent of the technically educated women stayed at home. Women’s participation in the labour force is low and expected to remain low because parents rather invested in boys than in girls. At the same time, women working in the non-agricultural sector were, on the average, more educated than their male colleagues. As is ever the case, urban girls attended school more than their rural counterparts.​[127]​
Compared to other Middle Eastern countries, Turkey for a long time held the leading position in the number of female university students. In the year of 1948, a total of 4,541 women were university students. This meant that a percentage of 18.4 percent of all students was female. In 1958 this percentage had lowered to 15.8 percent, yet was raised to 19 percent of female students in 1968. Between 1978 and 1983 the percentage of female students increased rapidly from 23 percent to 29.7 percent, representing the number of 83,577 female Turkish students. The percentage of female academicians rose to 26.8 percent in the same year. From the last statistics on tertiary education enrolment in Turkey in 2005 can be derived that 26 percent of all women and 36 percent of all men received tertiary education, and that 42 percent of all students is female.​[128]​
	The further educational participation rates of Turkish women indicate more progress has been made. In 2005, 87 percent of the girls received primary education and 92 percent of the boys. The percentage of girls participating in primary education was 48 percent. 61 percent of the girls and 72 percent of the boys received secondary education, and the girls’ percentage of participants was 44 percent. Among adults 80 percent of the women could read and write, while 95 percent of the men were literate. Among the youth, 93 percent of the females were literate, and 98 percent of the males. Educational inequality still exists in Turkey, but the gap is closing up.​[129]​ 

Political equality and progress of Turkish Women
In the Turkish Republic women are free to vote and participate in politics. Although there are some women in high political positions, they are exceptions. According to Janet Browning they are merely “welcome evidence” of an egalitarian system. It is necessary to realise that many Western nations deal with the same inequality of gender representation in politics. In 1985 Browning analysed that the family is still very much considered the basis of the Turkish society. Therefore, the patriarchal influence on women participating in politics cannot be denied. On the other hand, although women were often instructed by their husband how to vote, only half of them followed their advice.​[130]​
	A clear example of women’s political activity was female intermingling in the increasing influence of Islam on politics. In the late 1980s, Islam became increasingly integrated into political programs. Kemalist feminists considered this development a threat to women’s rights, while Islamist feminists fought to have women wearing a headscarf admitted at universities. Both groups clearly felt the freedom to act in the political arena on behalf of the rights of their sex, no matter the difference of their argument.​[131]​
	The numbers of women represented in the Turkish parliament show that political equality has not yet been reached, and that women still need to make progress in politics in order to reach it. In 1993, the first female Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, was elected. The election of a woman in such a high position has never happened in countries as the Netherlands or the United States. There was a time that the percentage of women participating in the Turkish parliament was higher than in the United Kingdom, but the numbers of recent years show otherwise. In 1995, only 2 percent of the delegates were female. From 2000 to 2006 the female percentage was 4 percent. In 2007 the female percentage of the Turkish parliament further increased to 9 percent.​[132]​ 
	Although women in Turkey have the longest history of political freedom, only in the very  recent years they have booked visible progress. If this trend continues, there is a good chance for political equality which has, so far, not yet been reached.

Social equality and progress of Turkish Women 
Neither Atatürk’s example, nor his speeches, nor the changes in the law that he instigated, could undermine the centuries of tradition augmented by religious beliefs and customs relating to women, says Janet Browning. “Women remained confined by the communal norms and customs.” One tends to agree with Binnaz Toprak that Turkish women had been (theoretically) emancipated in some aspects of life, but not yet liberated. Socio-economic indicators had proved that the majority of Turkish women still endorsed traditional values and mores, especially in the rural community. Even advertisements reinforced the message of women in the domestic consumption role.​[133]​
	“Until the 1980s Turkey has prided itself on the women’s emancipation that the Kemalists had delivered.” After that, Turkish women had become more critical of the way this emancipation was introduced and how it was related to Atatürk’s modernization. Although tradition was still strong, because of Turkey’s ties to the Western world and globalization, Turkish women and women’s groups had the chance to call themselves feminist. During the political crisis in 1980 when both radical Left and Right political actors were persecuted, women had the chance to stand in the gap to demand social equality that went beyond formal equality. They expressed their need to control their own sexuality and protested against domestic violence.​[134]​ 
	Women began to publicize their point of view in society through columns in magazines and later a younger generation of feminists even started its own magazine called Feminist. A group of socialist feminists that were against the capitalist system published another magazine, Kaktüs. These magazines have increased Turkish feminist discourse, although they circulated for only a few years. Kurdish women started to publish feminist magazines as well, but separately, because they did not feel recognized in Turkish women’s groups and literature. Examples are Roza, Jijun and Pazartesi which all started to publish in 1996.​[135]​
 	Islamic ideology became more popular in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, women risked their academic career by wearing a veil at campus and aligning with Islamists, opposing Kemalist women. They distinguished themselves from “unconscious or false” Muslims by calling themselves “conscious” Muslims. Their physical appearance, for instance wearing a veil, underlined their Islamist identity. Some women chose to be part of an environment in which Islam was interpreted in a traditional way. Others were required by their environment to stay in their traditional modest position. It is hard to say how many women chose this social environment, and how many were forced by their families and their marriage. At the same time we have to be careful regarding the meaning or reason for women to wear a veil.  When women wear a veil, this does not always mean they associate with Islamists. It is often used to just create some private space, desexualize contacts with men, or proclaim ones respectability. Of course, the need for such expression of respectability is the consequence of an Islamic context and way of looking at women.​[136]​ 
	Today, the question of the veil is still a contested issue in Turkey, but it is more centred on the general conflict between the secular CHP and the religious AKP, than it is determined by the endeavour of social equality for women.​[137]​

Economic equality and progress of Turkish Women
During the years of war, as many as 30 percent of factory workers were women. Also the number of women working in agriculture rose dramatically from 1.6 million in 1927 to 2.7 million in 1935. The number of men remained stable. Rural women usually participated in the work although a distinct division of labour by sex could be noted among waged labourers (mechanics and tractor drivers). Labour intensive activities during the harvest season were performed by both sexes of all ages. In the regions where large-property was the rule, a quasi feudal system bore heavily on women. In these regions the extended family was the prevalent household form, and in addition to farm work, women had to look after a great number of children. They had to obey all men of the family and all older wives and female relatives. Literacy was at its lowest among these women, and there was no way to escape by education. In the cities, the number of women in other enterprises as administration and civil service remained low. Atatürk did not actively try to change this and always considered occupations of women subordinate to motherhood.​[138]​ 
Industrialization after 1950 technically meant a decline of jobs for women because of the increasing usage of machinery. Thereby, women received lower wages because “their” industries, like carpet-weaving, textiles, food and clothing industries, had lower wages on average. In 1965, women made up 38 percent of the working population; 94 percent of these women worked in agriculture, and were generally not receiving a salary for their work. By the late sixties, an opening of Turkish exports to EEC countries led to a sudden expansion of the female labour force in industry. In the 1970s most women working in agriculture were still not paid. Women only comprised 30 percent of the paid workers, while in non-agricultural work women comprised only 11 percent of paid workers.​[139]​ 
Women working in the civil service did receive a salary. The number of civil servants had increased through the years, and so had the percentage of female civil servants.  In 1946 there were 30.046 female civil servants, which meant 13.5 percent of the total. In 1970 123.812 women worked for the government and comprised 19 percent of the total of civil employees. Between 1978 and 1982 the percentage remained stable at 25 percent in, while the actual number of female civil servants continued to rise.​[140]​
	In the period from 1950 to 1980, the percentage of women that were economically active gradually declined from 71.8 to 42.1 percent of the female employable population. There is clear economic inequality as the decline in the male economically active population was about 12 percent over thirty years, while for women it was almost 30 percent. In 1950, the percentage point difference between economically active men and women was only 15.7 percent. In 1980, the inequality gap had increased to 33.3 percent. There are several reasons that explain this decrease of the economically active population, which also hit the male employable population. In this period, urbanization took place in Turkey, what caused an overflow of the labour market in the cities. The industrial economic sector failed to fully integrate this large influx of workers. We must also take into account that many women worked out of economic neccesity. Women formerly worked to help their family survive. The decrease of female economic activity might have actually meant that the income of the male family head became sufficient to sustain the family.​[141]​




Causes of women’s emancipation in Turkey

The presence of a secular, modernizing, government
After the formation of a secular state in 1923, there has been an ongoing struggle between secular and Islamic forces in Turkish politics. In some periods this struggle was more apparent than in others, but it has been latently present. Islamization of the government was essentially rejected by Kemalists as an obstacle to modernization. Some writers argue though, that there has always been an ongoing process in Turkey of politicization of culture, which was inherently linked to Islam. The government has remained secular up until this present day, but secularists fear that current developments of Islamization are a threat to Turkish democracy. A painstaking process of distinguishing ‘innocent’ Islamic demands from political, ‘hazardous’ ones has been going on for decades. Veiling has been a central topic in this debate. Secular Turks wonder why Islamists want to go back to the Dark Ages when people were manipulated by clerics, and Islamists think Turkey lost its soul when it wanted to become Westernized. Although these tensions have influenced women in various ways, there is no doubt that the presence of the Turkish secular government has benefited women’s emancipation in the second half of the twentieth century. ​[143]​
The attitude and the method introduced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk towards the emancipation of women differed sharply from that of other Middle Eastern leaders, like Rezah Shah. On 3 February 1923 Atatürk promised in a speech that “Turkish women shall be free, enjoy education, and occupy a position equal to that of men, as they are entitled to it.” Unlike the Shah he was sensitive towards the autonomy of women and careful not to transgress the boundaries of Islamic rule of modesty. Atatürk never issued any decree concerning the veiling of women. Atatürk’s wife remained veiled, showing that the secularization of the government had no negative consequences for Muslim custom. Nationalism though, was completely secularized. Atatürk based his system of gender reforms on law and education, chiefly reaching the urban female elite. ​[144]​
Atatürk’s reforms have caused great numbers of professional women to rise. On the other hand, critics of Westernization have welcomed the reactionary trend of large numbers of young zealous Islamic women. Fundamentalists see Atatürk as destroyer of the moral basis cherished during centuries of Ottoman rule. Additionally, one of the main consequences of the secularization of the government was the increasingly sharp polarization of rural and urban values. The opposite popular opinions have continued to exist until the present day.​[145]​
In 1938 Atatürk died, yet the secularity of the government remained intact. How can the lasting success of the secularizing reforms be explained? The first reason is that before the revolution already a long history of modernization existed in the Ottoman Empire. The second reason was that there was no direct influence of colonial rule, although, according to some writers, Westernization which is seen by writers as Benjamin Barber as cultural colonization, began as early as 1793. This might have positively influenced the Turkish attitude towards Europe and modernization. Another aspect that might have sustained the success of the secular state is the popularity of the nationalist state ideology, and at the same time, the discrediting of the old sultan-caliphate regime.​[146]​
	Up to the current day, secularism has been dominant over other ideological streams in Turkish law and politics. A recent decision of the Constitutional Court in Ankara on the question of ‘veiling at universities’ indicated a victory for the secular opposition of the religious AK party. The allowance of wearing a veil on campus was declared illegal and is seen by many as the next step to the banning of the AK party and the foundation of a new secular government.​[147]​

The formation of women’s groups
In the 1980s women’s groups were formed out of the ‘second feminist wave’ that took place in Turkey. Women demanded an expansion of their formal equality to actual equality in a formal way. Over the course of time, the women’s movement split up into various groups, according to their political and religious preference. “A fundamental cleavage among the women of this period was between the secular and the Islamist women. Over time, both groups were separated into numerous other divisions.” For instance, in the secular women’s group there were radical feminists, Kemalist feminists and communist feminists. An example of an Islamist women’s organization was the Istanbul Welfare Party Women’s Commission. Women’s groups could act and move freely on the behalf of women of all kinds of ideological backgrounds, and some actions have later on resulted in laws being adapted to their demands. ​[148]​ 
	 
Absence of War
World War I had created jobs for women in ammunition and food factories which caused women to actively participate in economy. Subsequently banks, hospitals, postal services and other administrative posts were opened to women as well. As we have seen in the previous chapters, wars during the second half of the twentieth century have often had the opposite effect on women’s emancipation. In the period of investigation, no war hit Turkey and women’s emancipation developed without violent interruption.​[149]​

Prospering Economy
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Turkey was a largely feudal and patriarchal agricultural economy. Atatürk knew that reforms on the economic area of Turkish society were necessary for modernization to be successful. He believed that Islam reflected the feudal state, and therefore economy needed secularization as well. Intensified industrialization, mineral exploitation and commerce were seen as vital to the independence of Turkey in the capitalist mode. A great landed elite and major class differences were still present. Atatürk was not interested in class struggle and actually used the ideology of populism to end it. At the same time, he was convinced that the economic structure of a country determined the social structure. Huge governmental interference was needed to support economic progress to keep up with the social transformations that were intended through law, education, and politics. In 1929, the worldwide depression hit Turkey badly.  Turkish economic analysts concluded that the Soviet Union had not experienced any economic disaster as a consequence of the Crash that had begun on Wall Street, New York. The Turkish state wanted to prevent a repetition of the economic crisis by starting five-year plans, following the Soviet system. The Turkish state interference and planning of the national economy was called ‘étatism.’ Before the second five year plan had started however, World War II had begun. Another feature of state interference in the economy was the nationalization of industries formerly controlled by predominantly English companies. All these initiatives were intended to stimulate the national economy and make it independent.​[150]​ 
As Turkey had joined the war on the side of the Allies the country received Marshall Aid from 1948 onwards. An underlying condition was that the state should fight communism. Turkey thereby became economically incorporated in the capitalist market system. The United States defined Turkey as an agricultural country, instead of an industrial country as former governmental planning had indicated, and Turkey had to abandon its nationalistic industrial plans. Economic independence turned out to be an unrealistic endeavour. But this did not mean that economic progress was halted, nor that industrialization in Turkey had come to an end. Rather the contrary.​[151]​
The incorporation of the Turkish economy in the capitalist market system attracted massive foreign investments. The United States accounted for 64.5 percent of the total foreign investments during 1951-63, and Britain for 24 percent. National capitalists profiting from this impetus of cash flow began permanent privatization of industrial sectors. Their representatives in government passed legislation designed to guarantee favourable conditions for them and their foreign investors. As a consequence, in this period, the petrol industry was largely denationalized and channelled into foreign hands. A governmental reaction to this development was an inward oriented import substitution policy. This was instituted, based on state-directed five-year planning between 1962 and 1977.​[152]​
From the 1960s onwards, the state tried to protect Turkish products against foreign competition. Although both luxury and export goods production took on a national characteristic, the development of these branches was linked to the establishment of multi-national corporations and their subsidiaries in the country. By the end of 1972 the share of foreign capital in manufacturing alone was 45.7 percent. Another development that was intertwined with Turkey developing as an industrial economy, was the increasing unemployment in the rural regions. This caused urbanization, which in turn provided in industrial workers.  The annual increase of the urban Turkish population since 1950 was 7 percent.​[153]​
The economic efficiency growth was clearly the product of modernizing economic planning and the room for foreign investments. In 1995, Turkey was identified by the US Department of Commerce as one of 10 "Big Emerging Markets". Nowadays, Turkey is among the most industrialized nations outside of the US, Western Europe and Japan. The Turkish economy, in terms of GNP, was in 1995 the eighteenth largest in the world. In terms of economic equity, a record of national income distribution among families shows that development in this area of economy is still necessary, but clear improvement has already taken place. 








The income inequality in Turkey is still high, but through the years it diminishes which means that economic equity is developing. 

Conclusion
Turkish women have experienced women’s emancipation to the greatest extent of the three cases. As early as 1923 they received almost equal rights with men, and these rights were extended to full equality in 2001. Although the partitioning of these rights is not perfect yet, the positive trend persists. We have seen a stable development of educational equality, although there is still a small gap with men. Political equality has yet to develop to a larger extent, but has made considerable progress in the last decade of the twentieth century. In the social arena women have the freedom to choose whether to fight for their cause in a secular or a religious context, which shows a considerable equality with men. It is still the question as to how far this development has taken place in more rural area and small villages, but on the whole, social change in favour of women is predominant. Although women are still less economically active than their male counterparts and women in Western Europe, they have reached a rate of equality in wages that is even striking in a Western context. Turkey can legitimately function as the most successful case in this comparative analysis. 


5. Comparing Women’s Emancipation Processes

Introduction
In this chapter I will compare the conclusions on women’s emancipation in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey through the universalizing method that has been discussed in the introduction. In the first part of this chapter I will discuss the extent of women’s emancipation in the units of comparison, and analyse the trends indicating progress towards it. Through comparison of the cases and analysis of the similarities and the differences regarding to women’s emancipation and national history, a balance of successful and unsuccessful emancipation can be made. In the second part of the chapter I will make a comparison between the successful and unsuccessful cases, and point out the causes of interest through a comparison with the conclusions that were drawn in the first part. 

Women’s emancipation in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey
In the analyses of the previous chapters we have seen that women’s emancipation trends have taken place in all of the countries, yet the countries do not all have the same outcome of successful emancipation of women. As we have seen, Turkish women have been emancipated to the greatest extent, and to make the comparison work, we will consider Turkey to be the successful case to which the other two countries can be compared. But as I have explained in the introduction concerning  the method of comparison, the theory on the causes of women’s emancipation in the Middle East can only be tested in case of two or more successful cases. Therefore, I want to distinguish successful emancipation trends in the other two cases which can be compared to the successful case to test the proposed causes of successful emancipation. 

Successful cases
Although there is still progress to make, in the case of Turkey we can speak of successful women’s emancipation as I have indicated in the analysis of chapter four. But we must not ignore the trends towards women’s emancipation in Iran and Iraq either. Over the whole period after World War II in Turkey, in Iran from 1950 until 1979, and in Iraq from 1950, but more concretely from 1970 until 1990, a development towards women’s emancipation has taken place. Here follows a concluding analysis of successful emancipation of women in Iran, Iraq and Turkey.
	In Iran women have experienced a rapid movement towards emancipation under the reign of Mohammed Rezah Shah. Like Turkish women in 1923, Iranian women received the right to vote and be elected in 1963. The Family Protection Laws of 1967 extended women’s legal equality even further and the contents of these laws are comparable to the laws regarding to the family in the Turkish Civil Code of 1923. In Turkey the actual effectiveness of the laws was proved by women’s demands of extension of the laws in 1975, which shows that the laws in favour of women’s legal position had been fully exploited, and had been found wanting at some points. In Iran statistics on marriage and divorce in the period around 1967 indicate improvement of women’s legal position as a consequence of the introduction of the FPL. At the same time we must realise that the amount of change of women’s official legal position was limited in rural areas and the villages in both Turkey and Iran. Nevertheless, similar developments towards women’s legal equality can be observed in Iran and in Turkey. In Iraq a trend towards legal equality for women was set in motion during the first period of the Ba’th regime in the 1970s. The Family Laws and the special provisions for women to protect their social and economic position were very similar to the Turkish Civil Code, and at some points even more radically focused on women’s equal position in society. Although the law regarding to the equality of women has only improved, since the imposition of the economic sanctions the enactment of the laws has diminished, and so has their influence on society. Still, during the first two decades of the Ba’th regime, a trend towards women’s legal equality was clearly visible.
	In the area of educational equality we can detect the same progressive developments in Turkey, in Iran from 1950 until 1979, and in Iraq from 1970 until 1990. In Turkey there has been stable progress in educational equality, even as the process has not yet been completed. The statistics indicate that there have been some minor setbacks on the way in the 1960s. In Iran, the process towards educational equality has not been ended by the Revolution and has even produced better results than Turkey. In Iraq the development towards educational equality was quite intense. At the end of the relevant period mentioned above the literacy inequality was less than 3 percent which is an outstanding record compared to the other two cases. At the same time, the current school attendance of Iraqi girls still has to increase, but it is quite comparable to that of Turkey nowadays. Iran remains the remarkable forerunner in this area. 
	From the analysis of political equality in the previous chapters can be derived that although some progress has been made in all three countries, the political situation is far removed from the ideal of political equality. In Iraq, under the Ba’th regime women gained a maximum of 11 percent of the seats in parliament, which has never been surmounted by any of the other two countries. This result has only been exceeded by the composition of the new Iraqi regime, which has been implemented and established under American guardianship, and has yet to prove its capability of independent government. At this point it must be said that political equality has never been reached in any country in the world. Currently, Middle Eastern countries as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan have 26, 27, and 18 percent of female representatives in parliament, while in the first two countries the elections and establishing of the government have been heavily guarded by U.S. troops. In the United States of America itself, 16 percent of the representatives in parliament are women. EU-countries like the Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Denmark and Belgium are among the few countries in the world that have come closer to political equality with over 35, but under 38 percent of women in parliament. Political equality may be possible in the future, but for now turns out to be quite irrelevant in relation to the comparison of the three Middle Eastern countries at hand.​[155]​
	In my successful case, Turkey, the social position of women is still influenced by traditionalism. At the same time, the performance and representation of ideology by secular as well as traditionalist women in the social arena, shows that Turkish women have achieved a degree of social motion space that was similar to that of Iraqi women in the first two decades of the Ba’th regime. In the 1970s and 1980s Iraqi universities were mixed, and traditionalism differed per area, like in Turkey nowadays. Also women were able to be active in all kinds of professions and could go to work independently. In Iran, the social space for women from 1950 until 1979 was still somewhat more limited. Because of political tensions, one expression of female activity in the social sphere was diminished in this period already. Outspoken women’s magazines with a, for instance, communist ideological angle of perception were banned by the dictatorial government. A sign of progress in this area is the rising marriage age of girls. We can say that in this area, Turkey and Iraq were further developed, than Iran.
	From 1970 until 1987 there was an enormous growth towards economic equality in Iraq. In some professional areas the participation of women even outnumbered that of men. This development was reversed after the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988, and was countered even further by the economic sanctions after 1990. Women in current Turkey have the same rate of economic participation as Iraqi women had in 1988, yet their salary is almost equal to that of men. Although many women were economically active in Pahlavi Iran, they were often paid badly or nothing at all. Although the rate of women’s economic participation was increasing, the revolution initially caused a set back in this area, but the regime later on admitted economical equality as in 2006, 35 percent of the work force consisted of women. Again, Iran lagged behind on the other two cases, yet recently shows great progress in this indicating area of women’s emancipation, which raises new questions about the current regime’s influence on it.  

Unsuccessful cases
The history of Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 until the present shows many set backs in women’s emancipation, yet also some contradictory developments taking place after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Countervailing tendencies in government and society have taken place ever since. Leaving the newest developments for what they are, there has been a vast period after 1979 in which women’s emancipation was out of sight, and unsuccessful. In Iraq, after 1990 we can see the same counter effective developments taking place resulting in unsuccessful emancipation of women. The developments taking place since 2003 have not yet proved their stability, but might indicate a turn of the tides. Either way, the period after the Iraq-Iran war and the economic sanctions as a consequence of the Gulf war have resulted in unsuccessful women’s emancipation. And even today, although there have been official changes through rapid installation of democracy and instant proclamation of women’s equality before law, women suffer great social, economical, and educational iniquities.
	Iranian women suffered all kinds of restrictions in the legal area of life after the installation of the Islamic Republic. The Family Protection laws were suspended, specific women’s rights annulled, and the veil became obligatory which caused many women to loose their job. In Iraq no laws had changed for the worse, yet the preservation of the laws in favour of women was deprived of sufficient official support as from 1990 onwards. 
	In contrast to the situation in Iran, the progress towards educational equality has been dramatically interrupted for about ten to fifteen years, resulting in extremely high illiteracy among Iraqi women today. Another problem was the rapidly declining quality of the education provided. Girls suffered from this more than boys did, because boys often were considered a priority by their parents, worth investing money in for private education. Although the situation has been stabilized, and the female participation of education is almost at its former level under the Ba’th regime, it is not even close to the level that was reached by Iranian women.
	In politics the situation is exactly the opposite. In Iran political equality has diminished ever since the Islamic regime was installed, and has made one percent progress since 2005, while in Iraq political equality diminished in the period between 1995 and 2005, but has made rapid progress since the installation of the new democratic government. 
	The social position of women has gone through a very dark period after 1979. The official increase of female crime and punishment of moral crimes indicate crude restriction and limitation of women’s social motion space. Although in Iraq there were no official social boundaries, similar oppression within and outside the family was taking place. Because of increasing street crime as a consequence of the economic crisis in the 1990s, no woman is safe alone and dependent on male family members. Many women started wearing a veil again, not because of governmental orders, but out of self protection. 
	Lastly, in the period after 1990 the economic participation of Iraqi women which first heavily declined has also later on never become as high as during the Ba’th regime. In Iran the situation seemed to develop in the same direction in the first decade after the revolution. But in the last ten years there has been a dramatic increase of women’s economic participation in Iran. This development might well be the result of the uninterrupted progress towards educational equality. If academic research should prove such causal relation exists, it means that education may function as a causal circumstance of women’s emancipation.

Deconstruction of success
Table 5.1 is an abstract reflection of what has been concluded so far. Of course, the table is an estimation and not a precise calculation of the success of women’s emancipation in the three cases. The table helps to gain insight in the composition of women’s emancipation however. Successful women’s emancipation is not a coherent process which is illustrated by the differing progress in each indicator. In the Iranian case for instance, the process towards educational equality, during a period of unsuccessful emancipation on average, indicates a positive trend. The deconstruction of success to the different categories of women’s emancipation make the sharp division between success and failure disappear. With this remarks I try illustrate my awareness of the relativity of the conclusions I am about to make. However, when fully deconstructed, the analysis is not useful in the universalizing context I aimed for.   
































 	Iran 1950-1979            Iran 1979-2008	      Iraq 1950-1990           Iraq 1990-2008	        Turkey

The causes of women’s emancipation in the Middle East
The presence or non-presence of possible causes of women’s emancipation in these three cases has been discussed in every second part of the three foregoing chapters. As the presence or non-presence of certain characteristics of, or developments within society are much more clearly detectable than the more complicated and sometimes contradictory facts indicating a certain development towards equality like in the analysis given above, I will not repeat the analysis already provided in the discussion of the possible causes in the distinctive chapters. To clarify the further discussion, I will now give a schematic reflection of the presence or non-presence of the possible causes of women’s emancipation in the Middle East in the five cases that have been distinguished from the three units of comparison through different periods of time.







Iran 	   1950-1979	(s)	1			1		       1			1

Iran 	   1979-2008 	(-)	0			0		       0			0

Iraq 	   1950-1990	(s)	1			1		       0			1

Iraq 	   1990-2008 	(-)	1			?		       0			0





From the conclusions stated above we can now derive the answer to the question of what is causing women’s emancipation in the Middle East, using Mill’s method of agreement. When two or more successful instances have one or several causal circumstances in common, these are the causes of interest. In Iran from 1950-1979 and in Turkey from 1950-2008 all possible causal circumstances are present. In the third successful case, Iraq from 1950-1990, war has been present. On the one hand this has had a positive effect on women’s economic equality, but at the other hand, destruction of facilities has negatively influenced the educational progress of Iraqi women. Because not all successful instances agree at this possible causal circumstance, according to Stuart Mill, we cannot consider it of interest and should ignore it in our explanation of women’s emancipation in all these countries. 
	Another result we must clarify is the presence of a secular, modernizing government in one of the unsuccessful cases, Iraq from 1990 until 2008. The similar presence of this possible causal circumstance in both a negative instance as the positive instances does not mean this cause is not of interest. It simply shows that the mere presence of a secular government does not result in a positive outcome of women’s emancipation. It proves that a combination of causal factors is needed to reach a clear trend of progress towards women’s emancipation. 





We have seen that the positive outcomes of Iran and Iraq in the earlier periods have not endured, and the current outcome of these cases is negative. At this point I would like to explain somewhat more extensively why this positive trend failed to persist in both countries. 
The economic progress in Iran during the Pahlavi era, which has turned out to be a necessary cause of women’s emancipation, was limited to efficiency, and lacked equity. The economic inequality gap grew and the economic growth and efficiency depended heavily on oil export. The Iranian economy of the period before 1979, although seemingly very successful, was unbalanced. Through comparison of the Iranian case with the Turkish case, clear differences in this causal area become apparent. Economic progress in Turkey was steady because the development towards economic equity was continual as well. The inequity in the Iranian economy was one of the main reasons for the growth of a disappointed lower class which eventually made the Revolution successful. 
In the Iraqi case the active role of the state in waging war caused the country to suffer severe economic damage. It resulted in further misery in the economic area because of the UN trade interventions after 1990, which were meant to punish the Iraqi government for violating international agreements. In this case no Revolution was necessary to counter the positive trend of women’s emancipation. The lack of economic growth was enough. In both the period of the positive trend as the period of the negative trend regarding to women’s emancipation, the government plays a decisive role. 
Many analysts agree on the notion that the other necessary cause of emancipation of women, a secular government, is needed to stabilize the situation in the Middle East. In the foregoing we have seen that it is not necessarily the secularism of a certain government that made counter-effective forces based on Islamic culture and religion counter-act successfully. Rather the underlying dissatisfaction of a growing poor population encouraged any intervention that might have changed the situation for the better. Islam is a religion and a culture that can be used for political and legal purposes just as well as Christianity has been used for this purpose up to the present day. It is not Islam or its doctrine in itself that made secular regimes fail. The example of Turkey shows that a secular governmental environment can give a place to Islamic culture and religion, even using it for political and legal purposes. It must be mentioned that the latter is very much disputed within Turkish society, but regardless of popular opinion, it remains a fact that the current situation shows that Islam can have a place in secular government without having the aim of tearing it apart. 

Looking forwards
Although not all possible causes of women’s emancipation in the Middle East could be examined in this limited amount of space, I am convinced that the most important and prominent possible causes have been discussed. Based on the universalising way of analysing this specific phenomenon, conclusions have been drawn that might change perspective on foreign policy towards the current conflicts in the Middle East.  
	Based on the conclusion of what causes women’s emancipation, it has become apparent that a successful economy in both the aspects of equity as efficiency is necessary to stimulate equality. Equality does not only function as an indicator of women’s emancipation but also as a necessary aspect of democracy. My opinion is that if we want democracy to succeed in the Middle East, and specifically in Iraq, healthy, balanced economic growth should be stimulated. At this moment, oil is one of Iraq’s greatest export products. The revenues should be carefully invested in the rest of Iraq’s economy to avoid the economy to grow crooked. Foreign interference should be specifically focused on stimulating economic equity instead of fighting abstract ideas of ‘Islamization,’ Islamists, and harshly promoting secularism. 
	If such cooperation is possible, I believe the future prospects of women’s emancipation in the Middle East will brighten up. The hunt for mass destruction weapons and the outrageous idea of invading Iran should be given up. Iranian women have booked more progress in the educational and economic aspects of life than Turkish women. Women’s education in the Middle East up to this point has only functioned as an indicator of women’s emancipation and has not proved to be functioning as a cause of women’s emancipation. It is very well possible that this is going to change. Perhaps the educational and economic development of Iranian women will bear fruit in the near future concerning the openness and governmental structure of the country. If it is true that the equality of women will cause political and economic stability in the Middle East like the writers of “Arab Human Developments Reports” (New York: United Nations) claim, educated and economically active Iranian women should be offered all the help available.
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